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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Scope of the Study.

This study is concerned, first with the

rules now in force in typical American public school systems.

Secondly,

it is concerned, with the court decisions which have resulted from cases
involving rules similar to those found to be in force at the present
time in American public schools.

This resulted in an investigation of

the most important cases in the field of pupil conduct and discipline.
No attempt has been made to examine every case involving pupil admin
istration which has come before the courts from colonial times to the
present.

The trends of Judicial opinions and reasoning have been

followed in ruling canes.

This has been done to establish a basis

upon which to compare the rules now in force for regulating pupil con
duct and discipline, with the ruling judicial opinion concerning these
rules.
In determining the nature and types of rules now governing pupil
conduct and discipline, over fifty sets of rules from schools of
thirty-five different states were studied.

This furnished the most

common rules from almost two thirds of the states in the union, rep
resenting all sections of the country.
In a study of this type, the only rules obtainable are school
board rules which are a matter of record, and which have been put into
printed or some other available form.

Many boards have their rules

recorded in their minutes, but do not have them classified and printed
in rule books.

In addition, there are the many rules of superintendents,

principals, and teachers, which are not available in most cases.

Superintendents, principals and teachers are considered agents of the
board, and any rules which they prescribe for the government of the
school must have the approval of the board which delegates to them the
power to make such rules.

The rules of the agents of the board would,

in a sense, be considered rules of the board.
This study deals only with school board rules governing pupil
conduct and discipline and no consideration is given to rules per
taining to health, transportation, tuition, or admission of pupils,
except insofar as any of these types of rules may be incidental to the
suspension or expulsion of a pupil for a breach of conduct.

No attempt

has been made to study the statutes of the various states, except in
cases where they have been referred to by the courts in rendering
their decisions.

Although no detailed study of the general subject

of punishment of pupils is undertaken in this study, the punishment
or penalty provided for violation of the various conduct rules is
considered in connection with those rules.

In certain cases the rules

in themselves may be reasonable, but the punishment provided for vio
lation of certain reasonable rules may make their enforcement illegal.
Need of the Study. A certain number of rules for the govern
ment of pupil conduct will relieve the administrative authorities of
school systems of acting upon numerous minor administrative details.
The absence of such rules calls for a frequent exercising of the dis
cretion of administrative officers.

As school systems grow larger it

becomes necessary, in the interests of economy of time and effort, to
prescribe rules to take care of the more general situations which are
certain to arise in those systems.

On the other hand, too many rules

are not desirable.

One can hardly question the truth of the statement

that "useless laws diminish the authority of necessary ones."

The de

sirable situation would be to have enough rules to govern the usual
situations, but not attempting to forsee and regulate all of the mul
titudinous angles of pupil conduct.
In making the necessary rules, administrative officers and school
boards must know the extent of their authority as well as the rights of
parents and pupils.

Administrative authorities of school systems should

be well enough informed about their rights and duties to avoid liti
gation which is likely to result from their rules and acts beyond the
scope of their delegated powers.
It is probably true that the rules collected in this study are
not of the type which most often come before the courts.

Rules of the

board which are a matter of record have been more carefully planned and
may be better advised than those governing some unusual or special situ
ation.

However, following the reasoning and decisions of the courts in

this study should be of assistance to administrators, enabling them to
become familiar with some of the tests which courts apply to rules to
determine their validity and reasonableness.
Method Bnployed in Making the Study.

About two hundred fifty

inquiries were sent out to school systems of various sizes in every
state, asking if the school board had a set of rules applying directly
to pupil conduct and discipline.

The respondent was asked to check

whether or not his school board had such rules, whether or not they
were available, and what amount of postage would be required for mailing
a copy of the rules and regulatiohs.

In this manner all available rules

from the schools contacted were obtained.
then classified.

The rules were tabulated and

The subject-matter of the various miles and the pen

alties for violation thereof were studied.
The American Digest System, consisting of the Century Digest,
the First, Second, and Third Decennial Digests, and the Current Digest
were used to locate the cases in the field of pupil conduct and disci
pline.

The cases which involved rules similar to those now in force

were found in the National Reporter System and in the Reports of the
various states.
Juris.

References were also obtained from volume 56 of Corpus

The cases thus located were studied and the courts' reasoning

followed.

The cases covering similar rules were grouped and any evi

dence of well established trends in judicial reasoning, as well as
agreements and conflicts in decisions, was noted.

In this manner the

courts* attitude toward various types of rules was determined.

By com

paring the rules which have come before the courts with those now in
force it is possible to classify most of the rules in our study as
either legal, illegal, or doubtful.

Through the study of the courts'

decisions it is also possible to determine the criteria by which the
courts judge the legality and validity of school board rules.
Purpose of the Study.

This study attempts to determine which

rules are found in force in American public schools, the courts' atti
tude toward these rules as determined by the cases involving these
rules which have come before the courts, and to point out the funda
mental qualities which the courts have decreed legal rules must
possess

Source of School Boards Power to Make Rules Governing Pupil
Conduct. Authority for establishing and maintaining an educational
system has been vested in the state legislatures.

The legislature, in

most cases, passes certain statutes which establish the more general
principles to be followed in carrying out the educational program.
School boards are created by the legislature to carry out the adminis
trative work involved in managing the school system.

Whatever powers

a school board possesses must be delegated to the board by the legis
lature.
“The courts are agreed that a school district may exercise the
following powers and no others: (l) those expressly granted by
statute, (2) those fairly and necessarily implied in the powers
expressly granted, and (3) those essential to the accomplishment
of the objects of the corporation."
The powers expressly granted by statute, whether general in nature or
specific, are valid unless declared unconstitutional by the courts.
The implied powers, and those essential to the accomplishment of the
objects of the corporation, are more abstract, and differences in
opinion may frequently occur concerning the legality of powers so
exercised.
Extent of the School Board's Power to Make Buies Governing
Pupil Conduct.

In this study we are concerned only with the extent of

this power as it applies to the making of rules and regulations govern
ing pupil conduct and discipline.

It is apparent that a school board

can not legally make any rule which conflicts with higher authority,
such as the State Department of Education, statutes, or the Constitution.

^"Edwards, N. , The Courts and the Public Schools, p. 116.

According to Corpus Juris the extent of a board's power in making rules
is expressed as follows:
"As a general rule the school board which by statute has the gen
eral charge and superintendence of the public schools has power to
adopt appropriate and reasonable rules and regulations for the
discipline and management of such schools.... and the decision of
such board, if exercised in good faith, on matters affecting the
good order and discipline of the school is final insofar as it re
lates to the rights of pupils to enjoy school privileges, and the
courts will not interfere with the exercise of such authority un
less it has been illegally or unreasonably exercised."2
Validity and Reasonableness of School Board Rules Regulating
Pupil Conduct.

When controversies arise concerning rules and regula

tions of school authorities,the question must be decided by higher
authority, usually the courts.

When called upon to judge such rules,

the courts apply the test of reasonableness.

According to Corpus Juris:

"A rule or regulation in regard to the discipline and management of
a public school, whether adopted by the teacher or by the school
board, must be reasonable in itself.. A presumption exists in favor
of the reasonableness and propriety of a rule adopted by school au
thorities Tinder statutory authority.... Whether a rule or regulation
is reasonable and valid is a question of law for the court."3
Where statutes are found, the courts will be governed by them. The
miles must not only be reasonable in themselves, but their enforcement
must likewise be reasonable.

The courts

"will never substitute their own discretion for that of the school
authorities; the enforcement of a rule will never be enjoined be
cause, in the opinion of the court, the rule is unwise or inex
pedient; a rule will not be set aside unless it clearly appears to
be unreasonable.1,4

% 6 Corpus Juris 853 (1932).
®Ibid.
4Edwards, H . , The Courts and the Public Schools, p. 526.

CHAPTER 2
RULES GOVERNING ATTENDANCE AND EXCUSES
Attendance Rales.

Most of the sets of rules examined contained

a rule or rules stating that attendance must he regular and punctual.
Requiring satisfactory excuses from parents or guardians for pupil ab
sence and tardiness is likewise common.

The penalty for these offenses

is left to the discretion of the school authorities in most cases, al
though a few sets of rules provide specific punishment.
Persistent non-attendance may result in suspension or expulsion,
or suspension followed by transfer to an ungraded school.

Unexcused

absences may result in suspension or in loss of points in recitation
and six weeks grades.

Persistent or habitual tardiness is punishable

by suspension or by loss of ten per cent of the daily grade in the
class to which the pupil is tardy.

Being tardy three times in any one

six weeks period is cause for suspension in some schools.

One school

considers habitual tardiness as truancy.
Court Decisions Concerning Attendance Rules.

A school committee

in Massachusetts made a rule that if a scholar were twice tardy, the
teacher should send the scholar to a certain member of the committee.
A pupil who was tardy for the second time was sent by the teacher to
this member of the committee, but she went home instead.

She was

suspended until she would conform to the rules of the school.

The

court refused to allow damages for unlawful exclusion, contending that
the making and enforcing of such a rule was a reasonable exercise of
power necessary to promote the discipline of the school.1

^■Russell v. Iynnfield (1874) 116 Mass. 365

The compulsory attendance laws now furnish the authority for the
rules found, on the subject of regular and punctual attendance.

Before

the enactment of such laws In the state of Iowa, a rule requiring regular
2
attendance was upheld by the court.

Suspension or expuls ion has been
*7

held Justifiable for unexcused absences in at least three decisions.0
A pupil was expelled for not complying with a rule requiring pupils
absent more than six half-days to bring an excuse from the parents explaining the cause of the absence.
the excuse was due.

The parents had been informed that

The court held that rule to be reasonable in that

it did not violate any rights of parent or child, and that no malice
was shown in its enforcement.

4

In upholding a school board's rule which provides for suspension
of any pupil who is absent without a satisfactory excuse six half-days
in any month, the Supreme Court of Missouri reasoned as follows:
".... the continued or repeated absences of one of a class not only
is injurious to the absentee, but if allowed beyond a certain point
is calculated to demoralize those who attend, and derange the or
derly instructions of the teacher..... 1,5
In an early Vermont case, the court upheld the school committee's
exclusion of a girl from school for absence contrary to the rules of
the committee, although the absence resulted from the command of her
Roman Catholic parents for the purpose of attending religious services
on Corpus Christi day.

2Burdick v. Babcock (1875) 31 Iowa 562.
^King v. Jefferson City School Board (1880) 71 Mo. 628, 36
Am. R. 499.
Churchill v. Fewkes (1883) 13 111. App. 520.
Ferritier v. Qtyler (1876) 48 Vt. 444, 21 Am. R. 133.
^Churchill v. Fewkes (1883) 13 111. App. 520
°King v. Jefferson City School Board 11880) 71 Mo. 628, 36
Am. R. 499.
Ferriti er v. Tyler (1876) 48 Vt. 444 , 21 Am. R. 133

School authorities are likewise the judges as to the validity
of such excuses.

"A general statement to the effect that the parent

or guardian kept the pupil home can not he accepted" is found in one
set of rules.

Another school includes this statement, "No mere state

ment that the child was detained at home with the parents1 consent
shall he accepted.11 The courts have not been called upon to rule on
these provisions.
Buies and Court Decisions Belating to Tardiness.
case

7

In an Indiana

involving pupil tardiness, the court declared,

"a rule requiring tardy pupils to remain either in the hall or in
the principal's office until after opening exercises is a reason
able rule; but in the enforcement of such a rule, due regard must
be had to the health, comfort, age, and mental and physical con
dition of the pupils, and the circumstances attending each par
ticular emergency."
The unreasonable enforcement of rules is brought out in an Illinois
case.
"What are reasonable rules is a question of law, and we do not
hesitate to declare that a rule that would bar the doors of the
schoolhouse against little children, who had come from so great
a distance in the cold winter, for no other reason than that
they are a few minutes tardy is unreasonable, and therefore
unlawful."7
8
An Iowa case recognizes tardiness as an offense against the good order
and proper management of schools, by declaring the following rules to
be reasonable and lawful:
"Any pupil who is absent six half-days in any consecutive four
weeks, and two times tardy shall be cotinted as one absent, unless
detained by sickness or other unavoidable cause, and shall be
suspended from the schools until the end of the term, or until
reinstated by the superintendent or board.

7Eertich v. Michener (1887) 111 Ind. 472, 11 N.E. 605,
14 N.E. 68, 60 Am. B. 709.
8Thompson v. Beaver (1872) 63 111. 353.

"Teachers may require absence and tardiness to be certified by
parent or guardian, in writing or personally, or by special mes
senger. All lessons lost on account of absence may be made up at
the discretion of the teacher."9
The courts evidently consider tardiness an offense against the
good order and proper functioning of the schools.

School authorities

will be upheld by the courts in making reasonable rules against tardi
ness.

The enforcement of such rules must, however, be reasonable.
Rules and Court Decisions Pertaining to Truancy.

Truancy,

"skipping school," and leaving school before dismissal are specifically
prohibited in most of the sets of rules considered in this study.

Tru

ancy is punishable by suspension or expulsion, or the case may be turned
over to the Juvenile Court, or the parent may be required to visit the
principal.

Pupils who leave the school premises before the time of

dismissal are considered withdrawn in one school, considered truant in
another, and suspended in several others.
In the case of Flory v. Smith, the court recognized in general
the school's authority to make rules requiring pupils to remain on the
school premises from 9:00 A. M. until 3:35 P. M . , and although upholding
the board in this particular case, the court felt that expelling pupils
for having lunch with their father in a nearby hotel was not a wise ap
plication of the rule.1®

In a Nebraska case the court held that a

board of education may reasonably restrain pupils from leaving the school
premises during the day.11
rarely get to the courts.

Cases involving truancy and "skipping school"
It is evident that the power of school boards

9Burdick v. Babcock (1875) 31 Iowa 562.
10Flory v. Smith (1926) 145 Va. 164, 134 S.E. 360, 48 A.L.R. 654.
11Richard8on v. Braham (1933) 125 Neb. 142, 249 N.W. 557.

to make and enforce rules governing truancy and "skipping school" is
generally recognized.

Such rules are considered necessary for the

proper functioning of the school.
Buies and Court Decisions Involving Outside Instruction During
School Hours.

Several schools have rules which prohibit pupils from

being absent from school during school hours for instruction elsewhere
without permission of the school authorities.

The various schools have

slightly different views in the matter as can be discovered by consid
ering some of the rules governing such situations:
"Pupils shall be allowed to leave school on the written request
of parents to attend religious services on church holidays without
being marked absent or required to make up the time."
"No pupil shall be allowed to be absent from school during the
regular session to take music, drawing, dancing, or other lessons."
Approximately twenty per cent of the schools from which rules
were obtained have rules permitting pupils to be excused on their re
ligious holidays.

About ten per cent of the schools do not permit

their pupils to be excused for private lessons in music, dancing, art,
or drawing.

Other rules governing pupil absences during the regular

session are:
"A pupil may be excused one and one-half hours per week for music
lessons."
"Pupils may be excused by the principal not to exceed two hours
each week to take music outside of school, provided such absence
from the school does not conflict with the regular work of the
pupil in the school."
"Pupils may be excused from school to take private music lessons,
in case their parents so desire on the following conditions:
(a) pupils will be excused only the last period of the day;
(b) and then only in case this last period is a study period;
(c) and then only when the work of the pupil in that subject
continues to be satisfactory."

"All principals are authorized to excuse from school attendance,
for a period of not longer than a day at a time, caddies, newsboys
to carry extras, and to do any other worthwhile work that will
enable a boy to earn some money. Boys may be excused for these
purposes whose scholastic record shows that they can afford to lose
the school time and who also have a satisfactory record on every
point on the citizenship card, provided their school attitude and
effort are satisfactory to the principal."
"No pupil or student under sixteen years of age will be excused
from any class period to take part in any commercial theatrical
performance."
The rules listed above indicate slightly different attitudes
toward the matter of absences from the regular school session for other
instruction or for other purposes.

These rules, however, cover minor

points, and hence they are rarely the single cause for court action.
In the case of Burdick v. Babcock, the court held the following
to be a reasonable rule:
"Pupils may be excused from the public schools for the purpose of
receiving instruction elsewhere, not to exceed two hours in any
week, at such times as shall not interfere with their regular reci
tations in school."^2
In a New York case, excusing pupils from the public schools for re
ligious instruction one-half hour weekly was held to be a lawful exer
cise of the board's discretion.^®

The Supreme Court of Alabama held

that a school board did not abuse its discretion in making a rule
against pupils leaving the grounds daring school hours to receive in
struction elsewhere, and would not reinstate a pupil who was expelled
for leaving school during school hours in accordance with her parents'
wishes to take music lessons.^

l^Burdick v. Babcock (l875) 31 Iowa 562.
l®People ex rel Lewis v. Graves (1926) 215 N.Y.S. 632,
127 Misc. Hep. 135.
^Christian v. Jones (1924) 211 Ala. 161, 100 So. 99,
32 A.L.R. 1340.

Court Decisions Concerning the Parent's Right to Select a Child1 3
Studies.

This question of whether or not pupils may be excused part of

the day for instruction elsewhere is very closely related to the question
of how far a parent may go in the selection of the courses which his
child studies in school.

Occasionally parents request either with or

without a valid reason, that their child be excused from pursuing some
school subject.

In some instances they wish to have the child excused

from some regular study of the curriculum and be permitted to take
music or other lessons elsewhere during the same period.

The courts

have not always been in agreement on these questions.
In 1886 the Supreme Court of Indiana held that
"school trustees have authority to require that a reasonable time
shall be given to the study and practice of music in the public
schools, and a textbook provided by each pupil; and where a pupil
is expelled for refusal to comply with such requirement, mandamus
will not lie, in the absence of a showing of some good excuse for
his refusal, although made under his father's directions, to compel
his reinstatement."*5
The court reasoned that the father's arbitrary wishes must be sub
ordinated to the reasonable rules of the school board.

The school

board's authority to require pupils to pursue particular subjects has
been upheld by the courts in several other cases.16

In these cases

the courts upheld the school board in expelling a pupil for refusing
to write an English composition, in expelling a pupil for refusing to
prepare some declamation work, in requiring all pupils to prepare com
positions and take part in debates, and in suspending a pupil for
refusing to study rhetoric.

15State v. Webber (1886) 108 Ind. 31, 8 N.E.708, 58 Am. R. 30.
160uernsey v. Pitkin (1859) 32 Vt. 224, 76 Am. D. 171.

In conflict with the cases cited in the preceding paragraph is
another group of cases which recognizes the parent's right to select
the studies which a child pursues.

In the case of State v. School

District No. 1 ( N e b r a s k a ) a school board was forced to reinstate a
pupil whom it had expelled because, in compliance with her father's
wishes, she refused to study grammar.

The court held the teacher had

no authority to administer corporal punishment for the purpose of com
pelling a pupil to pursue a study which.her father forbade her to
lO
study. °

In an Illinois case the court held that the directors had no

authority to prescribe a rule which should cause a pupil to be ejected
from the school for refusing to study bookkeeping, when her parents
did not wish her to study it.'*®

In the case of Trustees v. People, a

boy satisfactorily passed all subjects required for admission to high
school, except grammar, which study the father did not wish the boy to
pursue.

The court issued a writ of mandamus ordering admission, con

ceding the parent's right to request that the pupil be excused from
studying grammar.

20

The Supreme Court of Nebraska ordered the rein

statement of a girl who had been suspended for refusing to pursue the
study of Home Economics, after the girl's father had requested that she
be excused from studying this subject.

Under the circumstances, the

court considered the father's selection to be reasonable.^

17State v. School District No. 1, 31 Neb. 552, 48 N.W. 393.
18Ibid.
19Rulison v. Post (1875) 79 111. 567.
^Trustees v. People (1877) 87 111. 303, 29 Am. E. 155.
21State v. Ferguson (1914) 95 Neb. 63, 144 N.W. 1039,
50 L.E.A.N.S. 266.

Considering the cases for and against the parent's right to
select studies which a pupil shall pursue, we can draw one or two con
clusions.

The state, which can compel a child to go to school, seems

to he able to prescribe what the child shall study.

In the absence of

statutory authority it seems that parents may make a reasonable selec
tion of studies for a pupil, provided that such selection does not
interfere with the discipline and good order of the school.

Ihrther-

more, the selection must not interfere with the rights of the other
pupils in the school.

When making rules or handling individual situ

ations in which the question of granting or refusing requests for
excuses for part of the school day is involved, the school authorities
should consider these same points.

The courts will uphold them in re

fusing to grant such requests if the school authorities can show that
granting the request will interfere with the good order of the school
or with the rights of other pupils.

On the other hand, a parent's rea

sonable request has great chances of success in court against an ar
bitrary hastily applied rule.

The courts are reluctant to interfere

with the school board's discretion in such matters, but to be on the
safe side, school authorities should consider individual cases care
fully, rather than trying to arbitrarily dispose of all such cases
with one general rule.
Rules Regulating Assembling on and Leaving School grounds.
A large number of schools specify that pupils may not assemble on the
school grounds an unreasonable time before the opening of the school
session.

In some schools this means no assembling on the grounds

before eight o'clock in the morning; in others a reasonable time means

twenty or thirty minutes before the beginning of classes.

In some

schools, pupils are not to assemble on the school premises at any time
unless supervised by a teacher.

In regions where weather is severe at

times, the rules occasionally specify that pupils may be admitted into
the building as soon as they arrive, during inclement weather.

Another

very common rule provides that pupils must leave the premises promptly
and quietly after dismissal at the end of the afternoon session. In
the case of Jones v. Cody, the court held Ma rule that the pupils shall
go directly home when dismissed from school.... 1,22 to be reasonable,
but the case is not exactly in point here.

It may have a slight ap

plication here, but it will be considered in a later chapter in connec
tion with another type of board rule.
Rules governing the time of assembling on and leaving the school
premises rarely come before the courts.

Rules of this type pertain to

administrative details, with which the courts will not interfere unless
malice, arbitrary action, or a deprival of constitutional rights of
pupil or parent are shown.
Rules and Court Decisions Concerning the Detaining of Pupils.
Rules concerning the detaining of pupils either after the regular
session or during intermissions are found in most sets of pupil rules.
The most common rule forbids teachers from detaining pupils more than
a reasonable time after school.

A reasonable time is considered to be

twenty, thirty, or forty, or sixty minutes, in different schools.

In

a few schools the length of time pupils may be detained is left to the

22Jones v. Cody (1902) 132 Mich. 13, 92 N.W. 495, 62 L.R.A. 160.

discretion of the teacher.

Most of the rules on this subject either

limited or prohibited the detention of pupils during periods of recre
ation, recess, or during the lunch hour, for correction purposes.

If

the conduct of a pupil during the recess period is detrimental to the
best interests of the group as a whole, the rules are reluctant to
recommend depriving the offending pupil of his recreation period but
suggest the pupil be given his recess alone.
Trusler, referring to the case of Fertich v. Michener, says:
"The Supreme Court of Indiana has held that the detention of a
pupil for a short time after school hours as a penalty for some
misconduct or omission, however mistaken the teacher may be as to
the justice or propriety of imposing such a penalty at any partic
ular time, does not constitute false imprisonment, unless imposed
from wanton, wilful, or malicious motives.1,23
The decision of the court in this case indicates that teachers may
legally detain pupils after school for a reasonable time.
In the case of Bozeman v. Morrow, it was held that the board
did not abuse its discretion in forbidding pupils from leaving school
grounds during recess and the noon hour.
In 1933, in a Nebraska case,25 the court held that
"A board of education.... may reasonably restrain pupils from
leaving school property. During the school day the control of
the pupils and their school programs is vested in the board of
education and its lawful agents. In conformity with this control
the board may have one or more sessions, as it deems advisable.”
A rule prohibiting pupils from taking lunch during the noon
recess, except from the school cafeteria or that which was brought

23Trusler, H. B . , Essentials of School Law, p. 29.
I^Bozeman v. Morrow (1931) (Texas), 34 S.W. (2nd) 654.
Richardson v. Braham (1933) 125 Neb. 142, 249 N.W. 557.
26Coffey, W. L., Eights and Obligations of Pupils, The Second
Yearbook of School Law, 1934, p. 9.

from home was held to he a reasonable rule.

It was prescribed for the

purpose of protecting the health of the pupils, and was within the
authority of the hoard, in the opinion of the court.
In a Nebraska case

28

27

the court declared:

“The owner of a cafeteria located near the school property does
not have such a vested right or interest as to give him a right
to require the hoard of education to change its rules so that
pupils may leave the school property to patronize his cafeteria."
From the canes just cited, it is apparent that school hoards
can make and enforce miles requiring pupils to remain on the school
premises during recess periods and intermissions.
in the case of the noon recess.

This is also true

One school specifies that pupils

living within six blocks of the school must go home for their noon
lunch.

Other rules provide that pupils must bring their lunch from

home, buy it at the school cafeteria if they do not bring lunch from
home, or get a permit to go home for their lunch.

The decisions of

*ZQ

the courts in several cases0

already cited indicate that these rules

would be upheld in court as reasonable and within the authority of the
board to make.
Summary.

Board rules requiring regular and punctual attendance

and rules requiring satisfactory excuses from parents or guardians for
pupil absence and tardiness are found in most sets of rules.

Compulsory

attendance laws furnish the authority for the rules on regular and

^Bishop v. Houston Independent School District (1930)
119 Tex. 403, 39 S.W. (2nd) 312.
2®Saffner v. Braham (1933) (Nebraska) 249 N.W. 560.
29Coffey, W. L., Sights and Obligations of Pupils, The Second
Yearbook of School Law, 1934, p. 9.
°^Bozeman v. Morrow (1931) (Texas) 34 S.W. (2nd) 654; Bichardson
v. Braham (1933) 125 Neb. 142, 249 N.W. 557; Bishop v. Houston Inde
pendent School District (1930) 119 Tex. 403, 29 S.W. (2nd) 312.

punctual attendance.

Courts have upheld rules providing for suspension

and expulsion for unexcused absence and tardiness.

If tardy pupils are

locked out of opening exercises or out of the building, due regard must
be had for the health and comfort of the pupils, and the circumstances
attending each emergency.
schools«

Truancy is prohibited in the rules of most

The courts have upheld rules requiring pupils to remain on the

grounds throughout the entire day1s session.

Rules regulating pupil

absence during a part of the school day for instruction elsewhere, for
religious purposes or for other causes, differ widely.

In a large

number of schools, pupils are permitted to be absent a limited and reasonable time, if such is the wish of the parents and if, in the opinion
of the school authorities, the progress of the pupil in school is not
jeopardized thereby.

Rules concerning the excusing of pupils from

certain classes by parental request and the extent to which a parent
may select a child's studies, will be judged by the courts on whether
or not the good order of the school and the rights of the other pupils
have been interfered with.

Rules governing the time of assembling on

the school premises and the time of admission into school buildings
should recognize climatic conditions to avoid unreasonable enforcement
of such rules.

Detaining pupils after school can not be construed to

constitute false imprisonment in the absence of malicious intent.
School boards may restrain pupils from leaving school premises during
school hours, which likewise includes all recess periods and
intermissions.

CHAPTER 3
RULES GOVERNING DAMAGE TO SCHOOL PROPERTY
Judging from the number of rules pertaining to property damage,
most school boards deem it advisable to have some rule which has for
its purpose the protection and preservation of school property.

It

seems reasonable enough that the board which has charge of the school
property should have the right to prescribe rules which will preserve
such property.

About ninety per cent of the schools whose rules are

being considered in this study, have rules of this type.
Current Rules Concerning Property Damage.

The most common rule

specifies that pupils must pay for defacing or damaging school property.
A few schools charge fines for undue wear on books used by pupils, or
have rules compelling satisfactory settlement of all issued school
property.

One school also includes a rule making pupils responsible

for damage done to the property of other pupils.
The punishment or the penalties prescribed for violation of the
rules concerning property damage or defacement must be considered.
This type of rule furnishes an excellent example of a rule which may
be reasonable in itself, but which may become unreasonable in its en
forcement.

Whereas ninety per cent of the schools have rules pertaining

to property damage, only one-half of this number state the penalties
carried by the rule.

Almost all of the schools providing punishment

for their property damage rules list suspension as the penalty for
failing to pay for damage or defacement of school property.

A few

penalties provide for either suspension or expulsion, and one school

will withhold the credits earned by the pupil until property damage
claims are settled.

Three schools make the parents directly responsible

for property damage by pupils.
Court Decisions Concerning Property Damage Rules.

Three cases^

involving property damage have come before the courts in which the de
cisions are similar.

The facts that the three cases all appeared

between 1880 and 1890, and that no later cases of this type have come
before the courts, seem to indicate that the three cases just referred
to have more or less settled the issue.
An Iowa school had a rule requiring any pupil who injured or de
faced school property to pay for the damage done.

The rule further

provided that pupils were not to be permitted to attend school until
payment for damages was made or the case otherwise adjusted.

Under this

rule, a pupil was expelled for not paying for a window which he acci
dently broke while playing ball.

The Supreme Court of Iowa reasoned as

follows s
"The state does not deprive citizens of their property or their
liberty or of any rights except as punishment for a crime. It
would be very harsh and obviously unjust to deprive a child of
education for the reason that through accident and without in
tention of wrong he destroyed property of the school district.
Doubtless a child can be expelled from school as a punishment for
breach of discipline or for offenses against good morals, but not
for innocent acts. In this case the plaintiff was expelled, not
because he broke the glass, but because he did not pay the damage
sustained by the breaking. The rule requiring him to make payment
is not intended to secure good order, but to enforce an obligation
to pay a sum of money. We are clearly of the opinion that the
directors have no authority to promulgate or enforce such a rule."

^Perkins v. Independent School District of West Des Moines (1880)
56 Iowa 476, 9 N.W. 356; State v. Vanderbilt (1888) 116 Ind. 11,
18 N.E. 266; Holman v. Trustees of School District No. 5 (1889) 77 Mich.
605 , 43 N.W. 996, 6 L.E.A. 534.
^Perkins v. Independent School District of West Des Moines (1880)
56 Iowa 476, 9 N.W. 356.

In a case involving a similar rule the Supreme Court of Indiana
says:
".... no rule is reasonable which requires of pupils what they can
not do. The vast majority of pupils, whether small or large, have
no money at their command with which to pay for school property
which they injure or destroy by carelessness or otherwise. If re
quired to pay for such property, they would have to look to their
parents or guardians for the money. If the parent or guardian
should not have the money, or if they should refuse to give it to
the child, the child would be left subject to punishment for not
having done what it had no power to do."3
A school district in Michigan adopted the following regulation:
"Pupils who shall, in any way, deface or injure the school building,
outhouses, furniture, maps, or anything else belonging to the school,
shall be suspended from school until full satisfaction is made."
A boy was suspended from school because he carelessly broke a pane of
glass and his father refused to pay for the damage done.

The court

refused to sanction the rule when applied to careless or negligent
acts of children.

It also reasoned that such a rule, if declared rea

sonable ".....might deprive poor children who are careless, as all
children are careless, of the right to a common school education, which

A
the laws and policies of our state have guaranteed to them.... "
Evidently the courts will not grant judicial sanction to rules
which suspend or expel pupils for carelessly or negligently damaging
or defacing school property.

The question then arises as to what at

titude the courts would take toward the enforcement of the same rules
if the damage were shown to be wilfully or maliciously done.

3State v. Vanderbilt (1888) 116 Ind. 11, 18 N.E. 266.
^Holman v. Trustees of School District No. 5 (1889)
77 Mich. 605 , 43 N.W. 996, .6 L.H.A. 534.

The

Michigan court hinted that such rules, if confined to malicious or
wilful injury to school property, may he unobjectionable.^*

It might

be reasoned that wilful injury to school property would undermine the
discipline or threaten the good order of the school.

If such is the

case, the courts may possibly uphold the expelling of pupils for
malicious and wilful injury to school property.
In the light of the cases cited, what type of rule should
schools make to protect school property?

A rule which requires the

pupil to pay for damage done to school property and which subjects
him to suspension or expulsion for failure to pay for such damage is
not likely to be upheld by the courts.

Such a rule has the obvious

weakness of depriving a pupil of an education for failure to pay a
certain sum of money.

As will be shown in a later chapter, suspension

or expulsion from school can result only from some wilful act which is
detrimental to the morals, discipline, or good order of the school.
While it may be true that most parents would rather pay for a window
glass or some other damage done by the child than to go to court, the
fact still remains that a school board can not afford to have rules
which are apt to involve the school in needless lawsuits.

Since the

courts do not sanction the suspension of pupils for careless acts, it
would not be wise to deprive pupils of school privileges for damaging
school property unless such acts could be shown to be malicious and
wilful.

5Holman v. Trustees of School District No. 5 (1889)

77 Mich. 605, 43 N.W. 996, 6 L.H.A. 534.

Similar reasoning might "be applied to rules which assess fines
for undue or excess wear on school hooks.

Undue wear could he con

sidered another case of a child's carelessness, which the courts do
not consider an act against the morals or good order of the school.
A court has, however, held that pupils who are financially able may he
required to pay a deposit to insure the proper treatment of free texthooks.

If the hook has been improperly handled, in the judgment of

the school authorities, and the deposit were to he withheld from the
pupil, the result would he practically the same as charging a fine for
undue wear on school hooks.
situation.

The issue is by no means settled in this

The case of Segar v. Rockport School District Board of

Education seems to he inconsistent with the cases previously cited,
relating to property damage.

7

Because of the apparent inconsistency

between the judicial reasoning in the property damage cases and that
in the case of Segar v. Rockport School District Board of Education,
it might he concluded that rules imposing fines for wear on free text
books are not assured of judicial sanction.
A rule which provides for withholding a pupil's school credits
because of his failure to pay for property damage is likewise based
upon a rather uncertain foundation.

The courts have held that a pupil

who has completed the requirements for a diploma may not he deprived

®Segar v. Rockport School District (1925) 31? 111. 418,
148 N.E. 289.
'Perkins v. Independent School District of West Des Moines (1880)
56 Iowa 476, 9 N.W. 356; State v. Vanderbilt (1888) 116 Ind. 11,
18 N.E. 266; Holman v. Trustees of School District No. 5 (1889)
77 Mich. 605, 43 N.W. 996, 6 L.R.A. 534.

of it for failing to meet requirements of some other rule not directly
Q

affecting the pupil's right to the diploma.
apply to school credits.

The same could possibly

On the other hand, a Michigan court held that

school credits "involve deportment and obedience to the rules estab
lished by the Legislature for the best interests of the public
g
schools*"
In this case a pupil violated a rule of the legislature
by joining a fraternity, and the court upheld the school board in re
fusing to award a diploma to the pupil.

In this same case it was also

pointed out by the court that withholding a pupil's credits and diploma
is not unconstitutional as providing for cruel and unusual punishment.
Summary.

Most school boards have adopted rules designed to

preserve school property.

Many schools require pupils to pay for

damaged or defaced school property.

The courts are agreed that a rule

depriving a pupil of the privileges of the school because of a failure
to pay for school property damaged through negligence or carelessness,
is not a reasonable and valid rule.

If the damage is done wilfully or

maliciously, thereby having a detrimental effect on school discipline,
the eaqpulsion of the guilty pupil will probably be upheld by the
courts,

Assessing fines for undue wear of free textbooks does not

seem to be consistent with judicial reasoning in the property damage
cases, and hence is a questionable procedure.

Eequiring pupils, who

®Roberts v. Wilson (1927) 221 Mo. 9," 297 S.w". 419; Valentine
v. Independent School District of Casey (1921) 191 Iowa 1100,
183 N.W. 434.
"Steele v. Sexton (1931) 253 Mich. 32, 234 N.W. 436.

are financially able to pay, to make a deposit to insure proper treat
ment of free textbooks has been upheld, but is apparently inconsistent
with the rather well established reasoning of the property damage
cases.

Withholding a pupil's school credits for failure to pay for

property damage is likewise not definitely supported judicially.

CHAPTER 4
RULES GOVERNING PUPIL CONDUCT OUTSIDE OE SCHOOL AND SCHOOL HOURS
The general situation regarding the power of the school to con
trol the child is summarized hy Corpus Juris as follows:
"Although a school teacher or a school hoard ordinarily has no
right of control over a child after he has returned to his home
or parents* control and can not punish him for ordinary acts of
misbehavior thereafter, (Lander v. Seaver 32 Vt. 114, 76 Am. D.
156), the supervision and control of a teacher over a pupil, and
of a school board, to make needful rules for the conduct of the
pupils is not confined to the schoolroom and school premises, but
extends over the pupil from the time he leaves home to go to
school until he returns home from school. (Jones v. Cody 132
Mich. 13, 92 N.W. 495, 62 L.R.A. 160; State v. Randall 79 Mo. App.
226; Hutton v. State 23 Tex. App. 386, 5 S.W. 122, 59 Am. R. 776;
Lander v. Seaver 32 Vt. 114, 76 Am. D. 156)."*
Rules Governing Fraternities and Secret Societies.

Schools from

seven of the thirty-five states represented in this study have rules
relating to high school fraternities or secret societies.

An Oklahoma

school has a rule which is patterned very closely after the following
extract from the Laws of Oklahoma:
"It shall be unlawful for any pupil registered in any elementary
or high school of the state supported wholly or in part by public
funds, to join, to become a member of, or to solicit any other
person to become a member of any fraternity, sorority, or other
secret society formed wholly or in part from the membership of
pupils attending such school."
An Iowa school has the following rule:
"Pupils are prohibited from joining or maintaining any secret
society, fraternity, or sorority. Presumptive evidence of such
membership constitutes grounds for dismissal. (Code 4282-4287)."
This rule is found among the board rules of a Michigan school:
"No pupil who shall become or be pledged to join, or who shall
join or become a member, active or otherwise, of any secret

*56 Corpus Juris 854 (1932).

society, sorority, secret club, or other secret organization
existing among the pupils of the public schools of Grand Rapids,
with a membership wholly or chiefly made up of school children,
shall be a member or officer of any literary, athletic, or other
society, or organization existing among the pupils of the public
schools of Grand Rapids, or which shall bear said school name;
nor shall any such pupil be permitted to participate in any of the
sports, contests or exercises of any society or organization, or
be a member or officer of his class organization or meet with or
take part in class meetings or exercises, or be in any manner con
nected with any school publication; nor shall the name of any such
pupil appear in any such publication.H
A Pennsylvania school rule covering this topic is similar:
"The principals and teachers shall deny to all secret societies
which may exist among pupils of the schools all public recognition
and no member of such society shall take part in any school contest
or school program or be a member of any team or club representing
the school."
A Kansas school has the following rule, prescribed tinder provisions of
chapter 320 of the 1907 Session Laws of Kansas:
"All pupils attending the public high schools of the city of
Wichita, and all persons desiring to attend said high schools,
who are members or active pledges of secret societies known as
or of the nature of fraternities or sororities, which have their
existence in whole or in part in the high schools of said city,
or where such activities of such societies work back and have an
effect upon said high schools, shall be excluded from attendance
in said high schools."
A Minnesota school rule is similar to the ones just cited, providing
for suspension or dismissal from the public schools for any connection
with societies which are not sanctioned by the board of education.

A

California school lists as one of the causes of suspension from the
public schools, the "membership in a fraternity or sorority which is
forbidden by law."
On the basis of the rules herein considered it is apparent that
school boards regard secret societies as detrimental to the best
interests of the school, and prescribe rules to prevent them from

operating among public school pupils.

The rules against such organi

zations are much alike in text, but the penalties provided are of two
distinct types.

In the majority of schools the penalty for secret

society or fraternity membership is suspension or expulsion from school.
Another method of control is that of depriving pupils with fraternity
affiliations from certain privileges of the school, such as membership
in literary, athletic, or class organizations and by not permitting
such pupils from representing the school in any public capacity.

The

pupils are permitted to attend classes, but are required to choose be
tween the various activities of the school and their activities in the
prohibited fraternities, sororities, or secret societies.
Court Decisions Concerning Pupil Membership in Secret Societies.
Several cases involving this question of secret societies among public
school pupils have come before the courts in a number of states, re
sulting in a rather well established line of judicial reasoning.
The Supreme Court of Washington declared that the school au
thorities
“had authority to deny to those pupils belonging to a secret fra
ternity, contrary to the rules of the school participation in
athletic, literary, military, and similar school organizations,
constituting no part of the school work, though the meetings of
the fraternity were held at the homes of the members after school
hours and with parental consent.''^
Because of the importance of this case it might be well to briefly con
sider the reasoning of the court, which follows in part:
“The board has not excluded the appellant from the Seattle High
School, neither has it threatened to expel or suspend him. He
can and does attend school, and under our construction of the

^Wayland v. Board of School Directors (1906) 43 Wash. 441,
86 Pac. 642, 7 L.B.A. (N.S.) S52.

rules adopted, he la at the same time permitted to continue his
membership in the Gamma Eta Kappa fraternity, although in doing
so he opposes the authority of the board and thereby forfeits
certain privileges which are no necessary part of the curriculum
or class work from which he is not excluded..... The board has not
invaded the homes of any pupils, nor have they sought to interfere
with parental custody and control. They have not said these fra
ternities shall not meet at the various homes, nor have they at
tempted to control students out of school hours. The evidence
shows beyond a doubt that these secret organizations when effected
foster a clannish spirit of insubordination, which results in much
evil to the good order, harmony, discipline, and general welfare of
the school.
Two years later (1908), the Supreme Court of Illinois held that
a rule requiring teachers to refuse public recognition to secret fra
ternities and sororities, to refuse to permit their meetings in the
school buildings, and to refuse to allow any member of such societies
to represent the school in any literary or athletic contest, or in any
public capacity, but not withdrawing from pupils who were members
thereof any public school privileges, was neither unlawful nor unrea
sonable.^

The court cited the case of Wayland v. Board of Education

and followed the same line of reasoning.
In 1922, the Supreme Court of Missouri departed from the two
cases just considered, refusing to sanction a regulation of the St.
Louis Board of Education, "forbidding membership of high school pupils
in secret organizations, and not allowing pupils violating the regu
lations to represent the school in any capacity or to participate in
graduation exercises."®

The court reasoned that no rule should be

®Wayland v. Board of School Directors (1906) 43 Wash. 441,
86 Pac. 642, 7 L.B.A. (N.S.) 352.
^Wilson v. Board of Education (1908) 233 111. 464, 84 N.E. 697,
15 L.B.A. (N.S.) 1136, 13 Ann. Cas. 330.
®Wright v. Board of Education (1922) 295 Mo. 466, 246 S.W. 43.

adopted which attempts to control the conduct of pupils in their homes
and out of school hours, unless such actions, if permitted, will inter
fere with the management and discipline of the school.

This court re

fused to follow the reasoning of the Washington Court in Wayland v .
Board of Education and the Illinois Court in Wilson v. Board of Education,
"which this court believes is based on faulty reasoning resulting
in an unfounded conclusion. Such reasoning does not prevent the
pupil from attending the school but he forfeits certain privileges
because of his membership in the prohibited fraternity. Those who
are members of the prohibited fraternities, unless same are shown
to possess the detrimental features stated, are as much entitled
to all of the advantages afforded by the school as other pupils.
To deny them this right constitutes an unjust discrimination un
supported by right or reason which should not receive judicial
sanction.
A dissenting opinion contended that this court should follow the cases
of Wayland v. Board of Education and Wilson v. Board of Education be
cause the rules involved and the cases are similar in their essential
facts.

It also stated that

"it is impossible to read the record of this case impartially and
not come to the conclusion that the effect of fraternities and
sororities in the high school upon their members and upon the
general student body is seriously demoralizing.
The chief reason for the difference in opinion between the
Wayland v. Board of Education and Wilson v. Board of Education cases
and the case of Wright v. Board of Education seems to lie in the fact
that in the former canes, the court was convinced that fraternities
have a decided detrimental effect upon the school, whereas in the latter
case, the harmful effects of secret societies were not demonstrated to
the satisfaction of the court.

^Wright v. Board of Education (1922) 295 Mo. 266, 346 S.W. 43.
'Ibid.

g

A more recent case was decided in Massachusetts in 1934.

The

courts refused to grant a writ of mandamus to reinstate pupils who had
been excluded from school by the school committee in violation of a
rule forbidding high school students to join secret societies without
the approval of the school authorities, and requiring existing unap
proved organizations to submit lists of their student members with
dates and places of all of their meetings or parties.

The court held

that the school committee was authorized by a statute empowering the
committee to supervise all organizations composed of public school
pupils, bearing the school name, or organized in connection with the
school.
Of the states which have provided statutory powers for the
control of secret societies by school boards, California, Iowa, Illinois,
and Michigan have had their statutes attacked on the grounds of uncon
stitutionality.

In each case, however, the courts upheld the consti

tutionality of such statutes.

The Iowa statutes prohibit pupils from

joining fraternities or societies without the sanction of the board of
directors.

The Supreme Court of Iowa upheld the constitutionality of

the statute.9

A California statute prohibiting membership of elemen

tary and secondary school pupils in secret fraternities, sororities, or
clubs, was held to be valid and constitutional.^-®

A Michigan law pro

hibiting high school fraternities was held not unconstitutional as a
denia,l of due process and equal protection of the laws, and not unconstitutional as providing for cruel and unusual punishment in withholding

®Antell v. Stokes (1934)1[Mass.) 191 N.E. 407.
9Lee v. Hoffman (1918) 182 Iowa 216, 166 N.W. 565, L.E.A.
1918 C 933.
^•^Bradford v. Board of Education (1912) 18 Cal. App. 19, 121
Pac. 929.

school credits and d i p l o m a . T h e Illinois statute (Laws of 1919,
p. 914) prohibiting fraternities, sororities, or secret societies in
the public schools of the state was held to be a valid exercise of
legislative powers for the promotion of the best Interests, discipline,
and good order of the schools.

12

The courts have definitely supported the legislatures and school
boards in their efforts to control or prohibit fraternities, sororities,
and secret societies or clubs among elementary and secondary school
1 7

pupils in the public schools.

Only one case ° seems to have departed

from the usual trend of decisions.

Except in the state of Missouri, it

seems safe to assume that school boards may legally prescribe and en
force rules regulating secret societies.

In all states, with one ex

ception, where such rules have come before the courts, the rules have
been regarded as reasonable and necessary to control or prohibit organi
zations which are generally believed to have a detrimental effect upon
the discipline, good order, and the best interests of the school.
Other Buies Governing Pupil Conduct Off School Grounds.

About

one-half of the schools from which rules were obtained, have a rule
making pupils responsible for their conduct on the way to and from
school.

Two schools have a rule making pupils responsible for conduct

anywhere if such conduct is detrimental to the best interests of the
school.

In addition to these general rules, some schools reported

rules of this nature but relating to specific acts or offenses.

Although1
3
*

11Steele v. Sexton (1931) 253 Mich. 32, 234 N.W. 436.
^Sutton v. Board of Education (1923) 306 111. 507, 138 N.E. 131
13Wright v. Board of Education (1922) 295 Mo. 266, 246 S.W. 43.

most of the schools have rules prohibiting smoking or the use of tobacco
in any form on school premises, a few added that the same restrictions
applied while the pupil was going to or from school.

Four schools pro

hibit gambling on school premises or in the nearby stores.

Five schools

forbid loitering in the streets, public places, or in the nearby or
downtown stores.

Two schools provide that pupils must not be on the

streets after 9:00 P. M. unless accompanied by a parent or guardian, or
unless carrying a permit from the local school authorities.
specifies that pupils may not attend dances on school nights.

One school
Another

rule, found in one school, provides that pupils rooming in town may not
entertain pupils of the opposite sex in their rooms.

One school re

quires pupils who wish to drive cars to school to obtain permission for
so doing from the school authorities.

Penalties are often not mentioned,

but when specified they usually consist of suspension or expulsion.
Court Decisions Concerning Pupil Conduct Off School Grounds.
Several cases have come before the courts involving the question as to
how far the school authorities may go in regulating pupil conduct off
school grounds and out of school hours.

Consideration will first be

given to rules regulating pupil conduct on the way to and from school,
and to conduct anywhere, if such conduct affects the interest of the
school.
In 1859 the court, in a Vermont case, upheld a schoolmaster in
chastising a boy for disrespectful language tending to bring the
master's authority into contempt, although the act was committed after
school on the preceding evening, while the boy was passing the master's

house.
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A Missouri court held that a pupil was properly punished in

violation of a rule prohibiting the use of profane language or quar
reling or fighting among pupils, although the violation occurred after
school hours while the pupils were on their way ho m e . ^
likewise upheld a similar rule.

A Texas case

In a Wisconsin case the court re

fused to reinstate pupils who had been suspended for publishing a poem
tending to ridicule the rules of the school, thereby affecting the
discipline of the school and impairing the pupils' respect for their
teachers.

17

A pupil was considered properly excluded from school for

being intoxicated on Christmas Day; it was held that such conduct wan
demoralizing to the other pupils and had the effect of impairing
discipline.

18

The court held in a Connecticut case that a teacher

had authority to punish a pupil who annoyed smaller children on their
way home from school, although such acts were committed after he had
reached his home.

19

In an early Iowa case, however, under a statute

authorizing the school authorities to expel pupils for gross immorality
or for persistent violation of board rules, a pupil was dismissed for
publishing a poem in a newspaper, which ridiculed the board.

The

court held the board had no authority to exclude the pupil from school,
reasoning that under the statutes a pupil can be dismissed only for

?‘4Lander v. Seaver (1859) 32 Vt. 114, 76 Am. D. 156.
^Deskins v. Cose (1885) 85 Mo. 485, 55 Am. R. 387.
^■°Hutton v. State (1887) 23 Tex. App. 386, 5 S.W. 122,
59 Am. R. 776.
'State v. District Board of School District No. 1 (1908)
135 Wis. 619, 116 N.W. 232, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 730.
*®Douglas v. Campbell (1909) 89 Ark. 254, 116 S.W. 211,
20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 205.
190 *Rourke v. Walker (1925) 102 Conn. 130, 128 At1. 25,
41 A.L.R. 1308.

immoral conduct or a violation of some regulation of the board.

20

The

reasoning in this case is not exactly in line with that in most similar
cases.

Since 1878, when the Supreme Court of Wisconsin called attention

to the "common law of the school" in the case of State v. Burton, the
courts have generally considered certain obligations inherent on the
part of all pupils whether or not the school board has reenacted such
obligations in the form of written rules and regulations.

21

A school board rule requiring pupils to go directly home when
dismissed from school, was considered to be a reasonable rule by the
court, and a merchant can not recover damages arising from a loss of
trade due to the enforcement of this rule.

22

The courts have considered

it the legal right and moral duty of the school to require children to
go directly home as soon as dismissed.

23

The often quoted opinion of Justice Norton in the case of
Dritt v. Snodgrass defines what the courts consider the dividing line
between the authority of the school and the authority of the parent
over the child.

The court considered a rule prohibiting pupils from

attending social parties during the school year as an attempt on the
part of the school to invade parental rights and even to supersede
parental control.

24

A Mississippi case furnishes another example of

the same line of reasoning.

A rule ratified by the board of trustees

required all pupils of the school to remain in their homes and study

**®Murphy v. Independent District of Marengo (1870) 30 Iowa 429.
21State v. Burton (1878) 45 Wis. 150, 30 Am. R. 706.
22Jones v. Cody.(1902) 132 Mich. 13, 92 N.W. 495, 62 L.R.A. 160.
^Deskins v. Gose (1885) 85 Mo. 485, 55 Am. R. 387.
^Dritt v. Snodgrass (1877) 66 Mo. 286, 27 Am. R. 343.

from 7:00 P. M. to 9:00 P. M. each evening.

A pupil was suspended as

a result of attending religious services with his father between these
hours on a school day.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi upheld re

instatement of the pupil, declaring the rule inconsistent with the
law.

The court quoted from Justice Norton's opinion in the case of

Dritt v. Snodgrass.

26

Because of its importance in defining the

boundary between parental and the school's control over the child, the
opinion of Justice Norton is included here.
"The directors of a school district are invested with the power
and authority to make and execute all needful rules and regulations
for the government, management, and control of such school as they
may think proper, not inconsistent with the laws of the land. Under
the power thus conferred, the directors are not authorized to pre
scribe a nils which undertakes to regulate the conduct of the
children within the district, who have a right to attend the school,
after they are dismissed from it and remitted to the custody and
care of the parent or guardian. They have the unquestioned right to
make needful rules for the control of the pupils while at school,
and under the charge of the person or persons who teach it, and it
would be the duty of the teacher to enforce such rules when made.
While in the teacher's charge, the parent would have no right to in
vade the schoolroom and interfere with him in its management. On
the other hand, when the pupil is released and sent back to his home,
neither the teacher nor the directors have the authority to follow
him thither, and govern his conduct while under the parental eye.
"It certainly could not have been the design of the legislature to
take from the parent the control of the child while not at school
and invest it in a board of directors or teacher of a school. If
they can prescribe a rule which denies the parent the right to
allow his child to attend a social gathering, except upon pain of
expulsion from a school which the law gives him the right to
attend, may they not prescribe a rule which would forbid the parent
from allowing the child to attend a particular church, or any
church at all, and thus step in loco parentis and supersede entirely
parental authority? For offenses committed by the scholar while at
school, he is amenable to the laws of the school; when not at school,
but under the charge of the parent or guardian, he is answerable
alone to him.

^Hobbs v. Germany (1909) 94 Miss. 469, 49 So. 515,
22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 983.
26Dritt v. Snodgrass (1877) 66 Mo. 286, 27 Am. R. 343.

"A person teaching a private school may say upon what terms he or
she will accept scholars, and may demand before receiving a scholar
to be taught, that the parents will surrender so much of his or her
parental authority as not to allow the scholar, during the term, to
attend social parties, balls, theaters, etc. except on pain of ex
pulsion. This would be a matter of contract, and no one has a
right to send a scholar to such a school except on the terms of
those who teach it.
"This is not so in regard to public schools, which every child
within school age has a right, under the law to attend, subject
while so attending to be governed by such needful rules as may be
prescribed. When the schoolroom is entered by the pupil, the au
thority of the parent ceases, and that of the teacher begins; when
sent to his home, the authority of the teacher ends, and that of
the parent is resumed. For his conduct while at school he may be
punished or even expelled, under proper circumstances; for his con
duct when at home, he is subject to domestic control. The direc
tors in prescribing the rule that scholars who attended a social
party should be expelled from school, went beyond their power, and
invaded the right of the parent to govern the conduct of his child,
when solely under his charge."27
In the case of Balding v. State the court recognized the right
of a teacher to require a reasonable amount of home study by pupils.

28

The Supreme Court of Georgia sustained a rule prohibiting pupils from
pQ

attending any show or social function on school nights. °

This case

concerned the expulsion of pupils for attending picture shows, although
the decision does not follow the usual trend of judicial reasoning.
This appears to be another case of what Justice Norton would consider
an attempt on the part of the school to supersede parental authority.
Current Rules Considered on the Basis of Court Decisions.

After

this consideration of court decisions in cases involving school board
rules which govern pupil conduct out of school hours and off school
grounds, the current rules may be considered in relation to these
decisions.2
8
7

27Dritt v. Snodgrass (1877) 66 Mo. 286, 27 Am. H. 343.
28Balding v. State (1887) 23 Tex. App. 172, 4 S.W. 579.
29Mangum v. Keith (1918) 147 Ga. 603, 95 S.E. 1.

Rales making pupils responsible for conduct on the way to or
from school, or for conduct anywhere if such conduct is detrimental to
the best interests of the school, have been upheld by the courts.
Likewise, rules prohibiting loitering in streets and public places,
rules prohibiting smoking on the way to or from school, and rules for
bidding pupils to gamble in public places, can be Justified on the same
grounds.

It is not likely that the board's authority would be ques

tioned in prohibiting pupils rooming in town from entertaining pupils
of the opposite sex in their rooms.
the pupils of the school.

The rule would prevent demoralizing

Although no cases have covered this point, a

rule requiring that pupils have permission of the school authorities if
they wish to drive cars to school would probably be upheld by the courts
if the board could show that this situation involves the welfare, safety,
and interests of other pupils, both in school and on the way to or from
school.
The reasoning which authorizes these rules is expressed by the
Supreme Court of Iowa as follows:
“If the effects of acts done out of school hours reach within
the schoolroom during school hours and are detrimental to good
order and the best interests of the pupils, it is evident that
such acts may be forbidden. Truancy is a fault committed away
from school. Can it be pretended that it can not be reached for
correction by the school board and teachers? A pupil may engage
in sports beyond school that will render him unfit to study
during school hours. Can not these sports be forbidden? The
view that acts to be within the authority of the school board and
and teachers for discipline and correction must be done within
school hours is narrow and without regard to the spirit of the
law and the best interests of our common schools. It is in con
flict, too, with authority.

S0Burdick v. Babcock (1875) 31 Iowa 562.

The rule forbidding pupils to be on the streets after 9:00 P. M.
unless accompanied by a parent or guardian, or carrying a permit from
the school authorities, seems to be crowding a bit close to the field
of parental control.

Likewise, the rule of forbidding pupils to attend

dances on school nights appears to be another borderline situation.
Although the rule forbidding pupils to attend picture shows on school
31
nights was upheld in the case of Mangum v. Keith,
it has already been
pointed out that this case is not in agreement with the often cited
cases of Dritt v. Snodgrass

32

33
and Hobbs v. Germany.

When making rules

of this type, school boards should consider carefully such questions as
these.

Can it actually be shown that the situation which this rule at

tempts to correct interferes with the good order, discipline and best
interests of the school?

Does this rule encroach upon the rights of a

parent to control his child?
social life of the child?

Does this rule attempt to regulate the

It is such questions as these that the courts

will ask if the rule is ever referred to them.
Summary.

In general, the control of school authorities over a

pupil, extends from the time the pupil leaves home to go to school
until he returns home from school.
The courts have usually recognized the authority of the school
board to regulate or prohibit fraternities, sororities, or secret organ
izations among pupils of the elementary and secondary schools.

School

boards have used different methods in their attempt to control secret3
2
1

31Mangum v. Keith (1918) 147 Da. 603, 95 S.E_
. 1.
32Dritt v. Snodgrass (187?) 66 Mo. 286, 27 Am. R. 343.
2®Hobbs v. Germany (1909) 94 Miss. 469, 49 So. 515,
22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 983.

organizations, such as suspension or expulsion of offending pupils,
denying certain privileges of the school to those who persist in main
taining their affiliation with such organizations, and refusing to
issue credits or diploma to a pupil who has violated the fraternity
rule.

,

Several states have statutes prohibiting or controlling secret

societies among elementary and secondary school pupils.

The courts

have upheld such statutes whenever their constitutionality has been
attacked.
Other rules have been promulgated by school authorities to con
trol pupil conduct out of school hours and off school premises.

Rules

making pupils responsible for conduct on the way to or from school, or
for conduct anywhere if such conduct interferes with the good order and
best interests of the school, have been considered valid, reasonable
rules.

Rules prohibiting loitering or gambling in public places, rules

forbidding pupils to smoke on the way to or from school, rules governing
the conduct in rooming houses of out of town pupils, and a rule re
quiring that a pupil have permission to drive a car to school, would
probably be given judicial sanction.

Although the courts have not been

called upon to rule on all of these rules, it is reasonable to suppose
that they would uphold such rules as being necessary for the best
interests of the school, unless malice or arbitrary action on the part
of the school authorities is shown.
Rules forbidding pupils to be on the street after 9:00 P. M.
unless accompanied by a parent or guardian, or carrying a permit from
school authorities, and a rule forbidding pupils to attend dances on
school nights are so close to the borderline between parental and

school control that the courts' ruling would probably be determined
by the particular circumstances in each individual situation.

Similar

cases have been decided in favor of both the parent and the school au
thorities, with the weight of judicial opinion in favor of the right
of the parent to control the social and home life of the child.

CHAPTER 5
OTHER RULES GOVERNING PUPIL CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE
Roles Governing School Attitudes and. General Behavior. Almost
every school which contributed rules for this study had one or more
rules that can be classified under the description of proper school
attitudes and general behavior.

The following will indicate their

nature and content:
"Pupils will show proper deportment and attitudes; pupils must
obey the rules of the school board, superintendent, principals,
and teachers; pupils are expected to be industrious, attentive to
duties, and diligent in study; pupils shall be quiet and re
spectful on the school premises, showing gentlemanly and orderly
conduct; pupils are expected to be polite, courteous, respectful,
and kind to each other and their teachers; pupils will be re
sponsible for proper conduct during recess; pupils are expected
to be truthful."
Many schools state similar rules negatively, such as those which follow:
"Pupils must not be guilty of any conduct detrimental or subversive
of discipline; pupils must not be guilty of wilful violation or
disobedience of rules, defiant opposition to authority, or inter
ference with the work of the school; pupils must refrain from
telling falsehoods and from cheating; pupils must not be obstinate
nor incorrigible; a pupil must not make a nuisance of himself about
the school; pupils must not be guilty of gross insult or other
serious offense; pupils must not have injurious, vicious, or im
moral habits, nor be guilty of such conduct; no obscene, indecent,
or improper language, writing or pictures will be permitted on or
about the school premises."
Many rules of this type are merely suggestions for the desired
types of conduct; others are intended as regular rules carrying speci
fied penalties and punishment for their violation.

Where penalties are

provided, they are usually suspension or expulsion.
Court Decisions Concerning School Attitudes and General Behavior.
The rules listed above were taken as representative of a large number
of similar rules found among those considered in this study.

A number

of cases will now be cited to show the attitude of the courts toward the
power of school boards to make rules of this type.
In an early Massachusetts case the court refused to interfere
with the school committee's action in excluding a pupil from school al
though the
"misconduct was not mutinous or gross, and did not consist of a
refusal to obey commands of the teachers of said school or of any
outrageous proceeding, but of such acts of neglect, carelessness
of posture in his seat and in recitation, tricks of playfulness,
and inattention to study and the regulations of the school in
minor matters."1
In a later case, the same court cited the case of Hodgkins v .
Inhabitants of Rockport in declaring that a pupil was legally ex
cluded from school because his presence "was a serious disturbance to
p
the good order and discipline of the school."
In this case it ap
peared from the evidence introduced that the pupil was so weak minded
that he was unable to derive any marked benefit from the instruction,
and in addition, he was troublesome in making unusual noises and fre
quently pinching other pupils.
In rules of this type which concern the general welfare of the
school, the courts have recognized the impossibility of school boards
forseeing every event and prescribing rules to provide for any situ
ation that might arise.

The courts have, therefore, agreed that school

authorities may dismiss pupils for any offense which interferes with
good order and efficiency of the school.

In 1878 the Supreme Court of

Wisconsin called attention to the so-called "common law of the school"

Hodgkins v. Inhabitants of Bockport (1870) 105 Mass. 475.
^Watson v. City of Cambridge (1893) 157 Mass. 561, 32 N.l. 864.

in the case of State v. Burton, in which the court declared:
"In the school, as in the family, there exists on the part of the
pupil the obedience to lawful commands, subordination, civil de
portment, respect for the rights of other pupils, and fidelity to
duty. These obligations are inherent in any proper school system,
and constitute, so to speak, the common law of the school. Every
pupil is presumed to know this law, and is subject to it, whether
it has or has not been reenacted by the district board in the form
of written rules and regulations. It would indeed seem impossible
to frame rules which would cover all cases of insubordination and
all acts of vicious tendency which the teacher is liable to en
counter daily and hourly."3
The common law of the school was cited in a later Wisconsin case
in which two high school pupils published a satirical poem ridiculing
the rules of the school board.

In denying the request for a writ of

mandamus to compel their reinstatement, the court held that although
the board had no rules prohibiting the writing of such a poem, it could
punish the offenders under the common law of the school.4

A California

case likewise illustrates the application of the common law of the
school.

A pupil was expelled for denouncing the policies of the board

of education at a meeting of the student body.

The effect of such

action was to create a spirit of insubordination among the pupils in
the school.

The court cited the case of State v. Burton5 and the

common law of the school in upholding the board in its action of ex
pelling the offending pupil.®
Another case in point is that of State v. Hamilton.

A pupil

was expelled for persistent disobedience and general misbehavior,
although the board of education had adopted no rules regulating the

Estate v. Burton (1878) 45 Wis. 150, 30 Am. B. 706.
^ t a t e v. District Board of School District No. 1 (1908)
135 Wis. 619, 116 N.W. 232, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 730.
^tate v. Burton (1878 ) 45 Wis. 150 , 30 Am. B. 706.
®Wooster v. Sunderland (1915) 27 Col. App. 51, 148 Pac. 959.

conduct of the school.

The court held that whenever the school officers

feel that the presence of a pupil is detrimental to the interests of
the school, and when a pupil persistently disobeys rules of conduct
prescribed by a common sense of decency and propriety, then the power
of expulsion is conferred.
In an Illinois case a pupil was expelled for refusing to divulge
the name of the person who had written obscene language on the school
building.

In sanctioning the board's action in expelling the pupil,

the court said:
"Every pupil when called upon by the superintendent or board,
should as a matter of duty and loyalty to what is essential for
the common welfare, freely state anything within his knowledge
not self-incriminating, that will assist in bringing the offender
to justice and thereby tend to the repression of all such of
fenses. If he refuses to do this, he is guilty of disobedience
for which reasonable punishment may be inflicted.....
An Iowa case differs somewhat from the other similar cases
herein cited.

A pupil was expelled for publishing an article which

ridiculed the board of education.

The board based its action on a

statute authorizing dismissal of pupils for gross immorality or for
persistent violation of the regulations of the board.

The court held

that the board has no power to punish for acts outside of school, if

q
they are not immoral or prohibited by any rule or regulation.

This

decision does not seem to be in harmony with the general trend of
judicial reasoning in similar cases.

^State v. Hamilton (1890) 42 Mo. App. 24.
®Board of Education v. Helston (1889) 32 111. App. 300.
%urphy v. Independent District of Marengo (1870) 30 Iowa 429.

Rules which require moral conduct on the part of pupils, and
which provide for exclusion of pupils guilty of immoral conduct have
been upheld by the courts.

In Massachusetts a girl was found guilty

of immoral conduct off the school grounds, for which she was excluded
from school.

The court held that in order to maintain the purity and

discipline of the public schools, a child of licentious and immoral
character may be excluded from school although the immoral acts were
not committed within the school.

Chief Justice Shaw reasoned that

pupils with contagious diseases are excluded from school because their
attendance would be dangerous to the other pupils and that incorrigible
truants are expelled, not only as a punishment, but as a protection to
the other pupils from injurious example and influence.

Therefore, he

said:
MThe power of all teachers is a parental authority to be exercised
for the best good of the whole. We think it was the intention of
the legislature to make the public schools a system of moral
training. If so, then, it is as necessary to preserve the pureminded, ingenuous children of both sexes from the contaminating
influence of those of depraved sentiments and vicious propensities
and habits as from those infected with contagious disease."^
The school authorities seem to have the backing of the courts
in making and enforcing rules relating to proper school attitudes and
behavior because such rules are deemed necessary for the welfare and
best interests of the student body, as a whole.

Cases have been cited

which have upheld the board's action in excluding pupils for acts of
neglect and carelessness, for persistent violation of minor rules, for
acts tending to create a spirit of insubordination among the pupils,

^Sherman v. Charlestown (1851) 8 Cush. (Mass.) 160

and for immorality.

The common law of the school has been referred to

by the courts in justifying actions of the board in the interests of the
general welfare of the school, where no specific rules have been pre
scribed to cover all of the various problems which arise in connection
with pupil conduct and discipline.

Pupils may be excluded for immoral

conduct, even though such conduct does not take place within the school.
Where immorality has been shown, the courts have sanctioned the ex
clusion of the offending pupils for the best interests and protection
of the other pupils in the school.
Rules Concerning Married Pupils.

Two schools reported rules re

garding the rights of married pupils to attend the public schools.

One

school reports the following rule:
"Pupils in any of the schools marrying during the school year
shall be automatically excluded from the schools thereby. This
rule shall not be construed to prevent married pupils from at
tending night-school or part-time vocational schools."
The following rule was reported by another school:
"No one who is married may be enrolled as a student in any day
school, and a student in any day school, who marries after being
enrolled in the school, shall be immediately dropped from the
roll. As night schools offer opportunities to adults in practi
cally every curriculum pursued in the day school, such persons
as are referred to in the above rule may continue their education
in the night schools."
These rules come from school systems in cities large enough to have
night schools and vocational schools for adults.

It is evident, from

the above rules, that they are not depriving married pupils of an op
portunity to receive an education; the board is merely stating which
schools married pupils will attend.

This is an administrative detail

and is not a question of denying school privileges to married pupils,

otherwise eligible to attend the public schools.

Although no cases have

come before the courts involving such rules under the conditions herein
implied, it is reasonable to assume that the courts would probably not
interfere with the discretion of the board in a purely administrative
matter.

However, if it can be shown that a pupil's right to an education

is being denied for no other reason than that of marriage, the courts
have regarded such action by the board as arbitrary and unreasonable.
Two cases will be cited to show the courts' reasoning on this point.
Court Decisions Concerning the Right of Married Pupils to Attend
the Public Schools. A girl pupil quit school in February, 1928, and
was then married.

In August of the same year a child was born to this

girl, and in the meantime her husband had abandoned her.

In the fall

of 1928 she enrolled in the public schools but was soon excluded by the
school authorities because she was a married woman.

The girl's father

originated proceedings in mandamus to compel the board of education to
admit his daughter as a pupil.

The school principal's testimony showed

her to be an average student of regular attendance whose deportment,
discipline, reputation and character were good.

In allowing the writ,

the Supreme Court of Kansas declared:
"On the record submitted here, we are of the opinion the evidence
was insufficient to warrant the board in excluding plaintiff's
daughter from the schools of Groodland. It is the policy of the
state to encourage the student to equip himself with a good edu
cation. The fact that the plaintiff's daughter desired to attend
school was of itself an indication of character warranting favor
able consideration. Other than the fact that she had a child con
ceived out of wedlock, no sufficient reason is advanced for pre
venting her from attending school. Her child was born in wedlock,
and the fact that her husband may have abandoned her should not
prevent her from gaining an education which would better fit her
to meet the problems of life."-^

1:LNutt v. Board of Education (1929) 128 Kan. 507, 278 Fac. 1065.

A case involving the right of married, pupils to attend the
public schools was decided by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in 1929.
The school trustees of the Moss Point public schools adopted a rule,
barring from the school married persons, although in all other respects
eligible to attend the schools.

A girl was married, but otherwise

eligible, enrolled in the public schools but was denied admittance
under the rule adopted by the trustees.
of the rule was placed before the court.

The question of the validity
The court considered the rule

arbitrary and unreasonable, and therefore void, reasoning as follows:
"The ordinance is based alone upon the ground that the admission
of married children as pupils in the public schools of Moss Point
would be detrimental to the good government and usefulness of the
schools. It is argued that marriage emancipates a child from all
parental control of its conduct as well as such control by the
school authorities; and that the marriage relation brings about
views of life which should not be known to unmarried children;
that a married child in the public schools will make known to its
associates in schools such views which will therefore be detri
mental to the welfare of the school. We fail to appreciate the
force of the argument. Marriage is a domestic relation highly
favored by the law. When the relation is entered into with correct
motives, the effect on the husband and wife is refining and ele
vating, rather than demoralizing. Pupils associating in school
with a child occupying such a relation it seems would be benefited
instead of harmed. Furthermore, it is commendable in married per
sons of school age to desire to further pursue their education and
thereby become better fitted for the duties of life; they are as
much subject to the rules of the school as unmarried pupils, and
punishable to the same extent for a breach of such rules."12
Thus it seems that the courts do not sanction the exclusion of
married pupils, otherwise eligible, from the public schools.

When such

rules do not deprive the excluded pupil of an education, but merely
specify that he shall attend a night school or a part-time vocational

lsMcLeod v. State (1929) 154 Miss. 468, 122 So. 737,
63 A.L.R. 1161.

school instead of a day school, there is the possibility that such
action would he considered an administrative detail to be handled at
the discretion of the board and would,therefore, not be a matter for
the court to decide.

No cases are on record involving this situ

ation, however.
Buies Concerning Bible Reading in the Public Schools.

The fol

lowing rules have been taken directly from the boards’ regulations in
schools from three eastern states.
"The morning sessions shall be opened by the reading of some
portion of the Bible by the Teacher."
"The morning exercise of all the schools shall commence with the
reading of the Scriptures followed by the Lord's Prayer, during
which service all the teachers and pupils connected with the
school shall be present, except where necessary excuses may be
granted by the Principal" (1931 rule).
"The Principal shall open the school each
least five verses from the Old Testament,
case no assembly exercises are held, each
least five verses of the Old Testament in
rule).

morning by reading at
without comment. In
teacher shall read at
the classroom" (1936

Regarding the legality of rules concerning Bible reading in the
public schools, the decisions are numerous and in irreconcilable con
flict.

Much time and space would be required to consider the many

decisions on both sides of this question, after which the reader would
be thoroughly convinced of the presence of this hopeless conflict in
decisions, but perhaps in no better position to guess what the courts
would do next.

Although no attempt will be made to list all of the

cases in point in this study, some idea of the conflicting decisions
may be obtained by considering what Trusler says on the subject:

"The constitutional difficulties in the way of allowing the reading
of the Bible in the public schools are apparent from the following
questions often involved therein, upon which the courts have been
called upon to pass.
"Is the Bible a sectarian book, so that the use of it in the public
schools constitutes sectarian instruction? This question has been
answered in the affirmative and in the negative.
"Is the reading of the Bible in the public schools in conflict with
the right to worship God according to the dictates of one’s own
conscience? This question has been answered in the affirmative and
in the negative.
"Do the reading of the Bible and the offering of prayer amount to
religious worship, constituting the schoolhouse a place of worship,
which citizens of the state are compelled to attend? This question
has been answered in the affirmative and in the negative.
"Do the reading of the Bible and the offering of prayer amount to
religious worship, constituting the schoolhouse a place of worship,
which the taxpayers of the state are compelled to support? This
question has been answered in the affirmative and in the negative.
"Do the reading of the Bible and the offering of prayer in the
public schools conflict with the provision that no public money
shall be appropriated for the use of sectarian schools? This
question has been answered in the affirmative and in the negative.
"Do the reading of the Bible and the offering of prayer discriminate
against any church, sect, or creed, or any form of religious faith
and worship? This question has been answered in the affirmative and
in the negative.
"Are the reading of the Bible and the offering of prayer any less
unconstitutional because all students who object thereto are excused
from such exercises? This question has been answered in the affirma
tive and in the negative."13
Trusler cites cases supporting both the affirmative and the
negative sides of each of the questions in the preceding quotation.
cause of the great number, they will not be listed here.

Be

There are nu

merous variations of this whole problem which can not be fully discussed

ISTrusler, H. R . , Essentials of School Law, p. 122-123

here.

It is possible to consider here only a few typical and representa

tive cases which bear directly upon the rules obtained in this study.
A Kentucky case will serve to give the views of those courts which
permit Bible reading and the saying of prayers in the public schools.

It

was the practice in this school to have the teacher open school by reading
from the King James version of the Bible, and following her reading by a
non-sectarian prayer.

The court held that because pupils were not com

pelled to attend the place where worship was held, the school could not
be called a place of worship.

The court further reasoned that the Bible

was not a sectarian book because it teaches no dogmas of any sect al
though some version of it may have been adopted or edited by some par
ticular sect.

The court summarizes its findings in a short paragraph by

saying,
"We believe the reason and weight of authorities support the view
that the Bible is not of itself a sectarian book, and when used
merely for reading in common schools, without note or comment by
teachers, is not sectarian instruction; nor does such use of the
Bible make the schoolhouse a house of religious worship."14
The Supreme Court of Illinois expresses the point of view of
those courts which hold that Bible reading is sectarian instruction.
"The reading of the Bible in school is instruction. Religious in
struction is the ooject of such reading, but whether it is or not,
religious instruction is accomplished by it..... They (pupils) can
not hear the Scriptures read without being instructed as to the
divinity of Jesus Christ, the Trinity, the resurrection, baptism,
predestination, a future state of punishments and rewards, the
authority of the priesthood, the obligation and effect of the
sacraments, and many other doctrines about which the various sects
do not agree. Granting that instruction on these subjects is
desirable, yet the sects do not agree on what instruction shall

14Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School District (1905)
120 Ky. 608, 87 S.W. 792, 117 Am. St. Rep. 599, 69 L.R.A. 952.

be given. Any instruction on any one of the subjects is necessarily
sectarian because, while it may be consistent with the doctrines of
one or many of the sects, it will be inconsistent with the doctrine
of one or more of them.
Excusing pupils who object to taking part in the religious exer
cises of the school is sometimes done to abide by the constitutional
demands of religious freedom.

The disadvantage of such procedure is

expressed in a Louisiana decision.
"Excusing such children on religious grounds, although the number
excused might be very small, would be a distinct preference in
favor of the religious beliefs of the majority, and would work a
discrimination against those who were excused. The exclusion of
a pupil under such circumstances puts him in a class by himself;
it subjects him to a religious stigma; and all because of his re
ligious belief. Equality in public education would be destroyed
by such act, under a constitution which seeks to establish equality
and freedom in religious matters."15
On the whole question of Bible reading and prayers in school,
the courts hold widely diverging views.

Since rules of this type are

by no means assured of judicial sanction, it seems that they might well
be omitted by all boards of education.

The desirable results of re

ligious instruction axe not being questioned, but whether religious
instruction should be carried on in a secular organization, such as the
constitutions declare the schools to be, might be questioned.

Certainly,

rules requiring Bible reading in the public schools are not assured of
judicial support, and any such attempt to combine church and state
creates a very delicate and dangerous situation.

^■5pe0pie v. Board of Education (1910) 245 111. 334 , 92 N.E. 251,
29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 442, 19 Ann. Cas. 220.
16Herold v. Parish Board (1915) 136 La. 1034, 68 So. 116,
L.E.A. 1915 D 941, Ann. Cas. 1916 A 806.

Rules and Court Decisions Concerning Patriotic Exercises in the
Public Schools.

Another type of rule which has recently come before

the courts is one requiring pupils to salute the flag of the United
States and join in the Oath of Allegiance to the flag.
of those whose rules were studied, reported such a rule.

Only one school
"The Principal

shall require the pupils of the school to salute the United States flag
and repeat the oath of allegiance on every school day."

Two recent cases

will be cited to bring out the reasoning of the courts on this question.
A pupil in Georgia refused to salute the flag, in violation of a
rule of the board of education, on the grounds that the salute to the
flag constituted a religious rite.

The court held that saluting the

flag is not a religious rite, but a gesture of patriotism, end that the
pupil was properly expelled from school.

The court reasoned that a regu

lation requiring all pupils to participate in patriotic exercises, in
cluding the individual salute to the United States flag, was lawful and
reasonable and in keeping with the policy of instructing youth in de
votion to the American Constitution, institutions, and ideals.^
A Massachusetts case is very similar to the Georgia case just
considered.

Under authority of a statute, the school committee of

Lynn, Massachusetts, adopted a rule requiring the giving of a salute
and a pledge of allegiance to the flag in every school at least once
each week.

In an action attacking the constitutionality to the statute

and the rule, the court held them to be not unconstitutional.-^®

^Leoles v. Landers (193?) (Georgia) 192 S.E. S18.
^•®Nicholls v. Iynn (1937) (Massachusetts) 7 N.E. (2nd) 577,
110 A.L.R. 377.

The courts have upheld rules requiring pupils to participate in
patriotic exercises, and have reasoned that the salute to the flag is
not a religious rite and, therefore, can not be objected to on that
ground.

The purpose of such rules is considered to be in keeping with

the policy of instructing youth in the devotion of American ideals and
institutions.

The need or wisdom of such rules is not a point of con

sideration in this study.
Rules and Court Decisions Concerning Dress and Personal Appearance
A majority of the schools from which rules were obtained have a general
rule providing that pupils must be neat and clean in dress and person.
One rule, for example, states that
"Students are forbidden to enter halls, assembly room, classrooms,
or attend games, when attired in a manner that causes merriment or
creates a disturbance. Girls are especially forbidden to mas
querade in boys* attire. The Principal is to be the sole judge of
what constitutes proper wearing apparel for high school students.
Exceptions will be made to students who are to participate in
plays or high school programs. The Board of Education by resolu
tion requires that students’ costumes for Baccalaureate Sunday,
Class Night, and Commencement Night conform to the specifications
laid down by the Board."
The school authorities are the judges as to when a pupil’s at
tire or appearance is detrimental to the best interests of the school.
The only penalty provided in any set of rules states that pupils whose
appearance is unsatisfactory may be sent home to be properly prepared.
However, if this amounted to expulsion, the school authorities would
have to be able to show that the pupil's appearance was a direct
detriment to the carrying out of the educational program.

The only case In which a pupil was denied the privilege of the
school for improper personal appearance was the Pugsley v. Sellmeyer
case.

A school hoard rule provided "The wearing of transparent

hoisery, low-necked dresses, or any style of clothing tending towards
immodesty of dress, or the use of face paint or cosmetics, is prohibited.
An eighteen year old girl was suspended from school because she used
talcum powder.

She sued for writ of mandamus requiring the board to re

admit her, which the court refused.

Three of the five judges of the

Arkansas Supreme.Court felt that a local condition may exist requiring
such a rule to assist in maintaining discipline.

Judge Hart's dis

senting opinion, in part, follows:
"Miss Pearl Pugsley was eighteen years old on the 15th of August,
1922. I think that a rule forbidding a girl of her age from
putting talcum powder on her face is so far unreasonable and be
yond the exercise of discretion that the court should say that
the board of directors acted without authority in making and en
forcing it. 'Useless laws diminish the authority of necessary
ones.' The tone of the majority opinion exemplifies the wisdom
of this old proverb."*2
In another case the court decided that dormitory students in
a Mississippi county agricultural school must comply with a rule re
quiring them to wear the prescribed khaki uniforms, not only while in
attendance at school, but when visiting public places within five
miles of the school on days when there was no school.^®

19Pugsley v. Sellmeyer (1923) 158 Ark. 247, 250 S. W. 538,
30 A.L.E. 1212.
20Jones v. Day (1921) 127 Miss. 136, 89 So. 906,
18 A.L.E. 645.

In a North Dakota case the court held that pupils may he forhidden to wear metal heel-plates when it is shown that the use of such
plates results in injury to the floor, noise, and confusion. A
A few cases involving the wearing of caps and gowns at gradu
ation have come before the courts.

The Supreme Court of Iowa declared

that the hoard may deny the right of a pupil to participate in the
public ceremony of graduation -unless a cap and gown is worn, hut that
the hoard can not withhold a pupil’s diploma for refusal to wear the
cap and gown.

"The wearing of a cap and gown on commencement night has

no relation to educational values, the discipline of the school,
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scholastic grades, or' intellectual advancement."

School authorities have the authority to require proper dress
and appearance on the part of pupils.

The courts will uphold all such

reasonable and necessary rules as being consistent with the best edu
cational policy.
Buies and Court Decisions Concerning Specific Acts and Offenses.
There are several rules which pertain to specific offenses.

Such miles

are intended to regulate some particular act which is the object of
the rule.

Many of the rules considered earlier in this chapter are

more general in nature and can be applied to a number of more specific
offenses.

In attempting to find authority for making some of these

rules governing specific offenses, in the absence of court decisions
on the subject, it may be possible to justify them under some more
general rule which the courts have upheld.

21Stromberg"v. Trench (1932) 60 N.D. 750, 2S6 N.W. 477.
22Valentine v. Independent School District of Casey (1921)
191 Iowa 1100, 183 N.W. 434.

Only one school had a board rule regarding report cards.
cards must be returned within a reasonable length of time.

"Report

Eailure to

do so may result in the pupil being sent home for the card, the same as
for overdue excuses, and making up the time missed thereby."

The only

case found which has a bearing on this rule, is an early Nebraska case.
The school board had adopted a rule requiring the teacher to send a re
port card, showing the standing of the pupil, to the parent each month.
The rule also provided that the card must be returned with the parents
signature or the pupil would be sent home to get it signed.

A father

refused to sign the pupil's card because the pupil's standing had
dropped from what it had been prior reports.

The court held that the

board could lawfully suspend the pupil for the father's refusal to sign
the card.

The court believed that a parent's refusal to sign a report

card is directly injurious to the welfare and interests of the school.
A few schools have rules forbidding hazing and hazardous, dan
gerous or "poor taste" initiations.

One rule of this type follows:

"Hazing in any manner or form will not be permitted or tolerated
in the public schools, in or out of school hours, either upon the
school premises or elsewhere. Any violation of this rule, either
directly or indirectly, shall be deemed just cause for suspension
or expulsion."
No cases have been found in which the courts have considered this rule.
It seems, however, that a rule of this type would receive judicial
support unless malice, arbitrary action, or unreasonable enforcement
on the part of the board could be proven.

Hazing could be carried to

such a point that it would not only interfere with the good order and

^Bourne v. State (1892) 35 Neb. 1, 52 N.W. 710

progress of the school, hut It could even he dangerous and jeopardize
the rights of pupils to an education.
A very common rule is the one which prohibits smoking or the
use of tobacco in any form on school premises.

No cases directly

hearing upon this point have been decided by the courts.

An early

Tennessee case involves the use of tobacco on the school grounds, al
though the main point in the case is of no concern to this study.

A

teacher made a rule, contrary to the wishes of the school directors,
forbidding the use of tobacco on the school premises.

The court main

tained that the teacher could not enforce this rule against the wishes
of the directors.

The court declared:

"While much may be said against the use of tobacco, especially
by young boys, yet it can not be said that the directors should
have sustained the teacher in denying to all who were unfortu
nately addicted to its use the privileges of the public school
which the law accorded to them or perforce, compel them to re
form and abandon its use even while on the school grounds out
side of the school room.
Aside from the fact that the directors of this school seemed determined
not to let the health and education of their sons interfere with their
smoking, there is a point which is of some importance in our consid
eration of "no smoking" rules.

According to this court the use of

tobacco by pupils is a matter intrusted to the discretion of the school
directors.

If such is the proper interpretation it indicates that

boards of education do have the authority to prescribe rules of this
type.

Trusler makes the following statement: "Undoubtedly it is a

reasonable rule that prohibits the use of tobacco upon the school

^Parker v. Jefferson County School District (1881)
5 Lea (Tenn.) 525.

g r o u n d s . H a l e s forbidding the use of tobacco by pupils could prob
ably also be justified as a measure for protecting the health of the
pupils.
Two schools have rules stating that pupils must not bring -unfit
reading matter to school, nor distribute any unauthorized literature.
Although no cases are on record concerning this point, it seems likely
that a rule of this nature can be justified.

Prohibiting unfit litera

ture would be an action toward maintaining higher moral standards among
the pupils, and toward developing tastes for better literature.

In

addition, prohibiting distribution of unauthorized literature would
prevent some unscrupulous businessmen or agents from using the taxsupported free public schools as an advertising center for their
products.
Perhaps very little comment is necessary regarding the authority
of school boards to formulate rules forbidding the use of intoxicating
liquor by public school pupils.

The degrading effect upon the whole

student body, when members of that group use intoxicating liquor, is
generally recognized.

In an Arkansas case a pupil was suspended for

being drunk and disorderly on a holiday, in violation of the ordinances
of the city.
suspension. ^

The court considered this act sufficient cause for
A single instance of intoxication on Christmas day, in

the absence of other evidence, would not seem to be a very direct
injury to the morals and welfare of the school.

The court did, however,

^Trusler, H. R. Essentials of School Law, p. 100.
^Douglas v. Campbell (1909) 89 Ark. 254, 116 S.W. 211,
20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 205.

express itself strongly against the use of intoxicating liquor by
school pupils.

One school has a rule which provides for expulsion and

turning of the pupil over to the civil authorities for the offense of
selling intoxicating liquor.
Three or four rules will now be be listed which the school
authorities often make and which undoubtedly would have judicial
sanction in the absence of malice or arbitrary action in the particular
situation on the part of the board.

In fact, these rules might very

well have been included under an earlier section of this chapter with
rules governing school attitudes and behavior.

However, because they

are very specific in nature and refer to some definite object, they
have been placed here with other rules covering definite and specific
offenses.

Several schools have rules forbidding pupils to engage in

quarreling and fighting.

In a case in an earlier chapter
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the court

recognized the right of the school authorities to prescribe a rule pro
hibiting loitering, quarreling, and fighting on the way home from
school.

If the school can govern such conduct off the school ground,

they certainly should be permitted to regulate it on the school premises
where the effect of such conduct is more direct.

Two other rules are

found quite often— one prohibiting gambling on the school grounds, and
another prohibiting stealing.

A rule of a similar nature, though found

in but a few schools, forbids the forging of excuses.

Such rules tend

to fit the pupil for participation in society because he will find
similar restrictions placed upon him in civil life.

Such miles are not

^Deskins v. G-ose (1885) 85 Mo. 485, 55 Am. R. 387

likely to be considered unreasonable because one of the generally
recognized functions of the school is to inculcate proper social at
titudes and habits of conduct which are in harmony with the best in
terests of society.
Most schools seem to have a rule prohibiting the use of profane
language by pupils.
ever, questioned.

The reasonableness of such a rule is rarely, if
In a Connecticut case, the court upheld the exclusion

of a pupil for using profane and insulting language to one of the school
trustees.

The offense was committed before the opening of school in the

morning, in the presence of other pupils.
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An Illinois case, which

has been cited earlier in this chapter, also brings out the attitude of
the courts toward the use of profanity by pupils.

In this case a pupil

had been suspended for refusing to give the name of another pupil who
was guilty of obscene writing on the school building.

At a hearing be

fore the board to consider his reinstatement, the pupil used profane
language to the board.

The court declared: "Where a suspended pupil

uses gross profanity and vulgarity to the school board on being called
before it he forfeits his right to reinstatement."
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It is evident

that the courts will not tolerate profanity by pupils and they support
the school authorities in making rules to discourage and eliminate it.
Rules prohibiting loitering in the halls or about the school
building would probably be considered as regulations governing adminis
trative details, in which case the making of them is a matter of

28Peck v. Smith (1874) 41 Conn. 442.
^^Board of Education v. Eelston (1889) 32 111. App. 300.

discretion on the part of school authorities.

One school reported a

rule requiring pupils to stay out of cars during school hours.

There

are no cases on record in which this question has been considered by the
courts.

A few schools reported rules forbidding pupils to throw

missiles on or about the school grounds.

The courts have not passed

upon these rules either, but they can undoubtedly be justified in the
interests of safety and protection of the student body.
A few schools reported rules providing that pupils must not bring
concealed weapons, firearms, deadly or dangerous playthings upon the
school premises.

This is another rule which is obviously reasonable in

itself and necessary for the best interests and safety of the entire
7Q

group of pupils.

In an early Texas case

the court ruled that a tea

cher may use whatever force is necessary to take from a pupil a pistol,
which the pupil brings to school.
General and Miscellaneous Rules.

There are a few rules which

seem to differ enough from those already considered to warrant placing
them in this section under a general and miscellaneous classification.
This rules deal either with school policies or with the conduct of
parents in relation to the school.
Three schools reported rules providing that pupils may not enter
a school while under suspension from another school, without the super
intendent's consent.

The exact rule reported by one school is as follows

"No pupil shall be admitted to one school who has been expelled from
another, or while he is under suspension."3
0

30tdetcalf v. State (1886) 21 Tex. App. 174, 17 S.W. 142

In an Arkansas case a father transferred his son to another district to
avoid punishment for an offense against the good order of the school.
The school authorities of the district to which the hoy was transferred
refused to admit him until he had received punishment for the offense
committed in the other district.

The court granted a writ of mandamus

requiring the district to which the pupil was transferred to admit him.
The court held that school authorities have no legal authority to
prevent any qualified pupil from entering the schools under their juris
diction, nor to punish pupils for offences committed before they entered
such schools.
The courts have not been called upon to decide a case similar
to the one above, in which a pupil might try to transfer from one school
to another school within the same district for the purpose of escaping
punishment for some offense committed in the first school.

Here the

pupil would have violated a rule of the school board in the first school,
and would be seeking admission in the second school which is governed by
the same board.

It seems that in a case such as the one herein assumed,

the board could punish the pupil or refuse to admit him in the second
school because the offense for which they would be punishing him would
have been committed within the jurisdiction of the board.

If this

assumption is correct, rules providing that pupils may not enter a
school while under suspension from another school would probably be en
forceable providing the two schools involved were in the same district.
If the schools are in different districts the Arkansas court
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has held

that such a rule can not be enforced.

^Stephens v. Humphrey (1920) 145 Ark. 172, 224 S.W. 442
32Ibid.

A rule to the effect that pupils not doing satisfactory work in
school may he demoted is found in several sets of school board rules.
A rule similar to one of this type has received judicial sanction.

A

Massachusetts school committee adopted a rule providing that pupils in
high schools with a standing below sixty per cent in two or more
subjects should be demoted one grade.

A pupil who was demoted under

this rule contended that he had been excluded from the school without
a hearing.

The court held that demotion did not constitute exclusion,

inasmuch as an opportunity was offered the pupil to attend the school
in the lower grade.33
A few schools have rules providing that pupils* relatives must
not disturb the school or abuse the teacher.

For example,

"Pupils shall be liable to suspension if their parents create a
disturbance in school, or censure, abuse, or insult any teacher
before his class or on the school premises."
A Georgia case illustrates the attitude of the courts toward parental
misconduct affecting the school.

A mother entered a school during

school hours and criticized the teacher’s conduct and methods in the
presence of her pupils.

The mother’s three daughters were suspended

from school on the ground that the mother's conduct had seriously
interfered with the good order and discipline of the school.

The

Supreme Court of Georgia refused to grant a mandamus to compel rein
statement of the children as pupils in the school.

The court reasoned

33Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelbourne (1913) 216 Mass. 19,
102 N.E. 1095.

as follows;
"Both (parent and child) must submit to the reasonable rules and
regulations of the school, and the parent must so conduct himself
as not to destroy the influence and authority of the school manage
ment over the children. Any act of disorder in the schoolroom
calculated to bring into contempt the authority of the school and
teacher should be met with punishment calculated to impress the
pupils with the importance of obedience and respect to constituted
authority.....
The courts evidently believe that parental misconduct may affect the
good order and discipline of the school to as great an extent as pupil
misconduct.

Although a pupil is not guilty of any misconduct, he may be

suspended for misconduct of his parents if such misconduct unfavorably
affects the discipline of the school.
Summary.

The courts have recognized the right of school authori

ties to make rules governing the attitudes and general behavior of pupils
in the public schools.

It is generally presumed that pupils know the

common law of the school and they are expected to obey the same.

Pupils

may be excluded from the public schools for immoral conduct, even though
such conduct takes place off the school grounds and out of school hours.
Rules denying the privileges of an education to married pupils, otherwise
eligible to attend school, have not received judicial support.

The

courts are in hopeless conflict over the legality of rules permitting
or requiring Bible reading and the offering of prayers in the public
schools.

Because of their uncertain legal status such rules might well

be avoided by school authorities or be based on state laws.

Rules re

quiring a salute and pledge of allegiance to the flag of the United States

^Cartersville v. Purse (1897) 101 Ga. 422, 28 S.E. 896,
65 Am. St. Rep. 312, 41 L.R.A. 593.

have been upheld by judicial authority.

Pupils must conform to the rule

which requires that they be neat and clean in dress and person.

Pupils

may be required to wear a cap and gown to participate in graduation ex
ercises, although the failure to take part in such exercises does not
deprive the pupil of his right to a diploma if the other requirements
have been satisfied.

Schools may require pupils to take home report

cards and to bring them back with the parent's signature thereon.

School

boards may legally make and enforce rules prohibiting the use of tobacco,
intoxicating liquors, profane language, and the bringing of concealed
weapons or dangerous playthings to school.

A number of rules now in

force in many school systems have not come before the courts although
they will probably receive judicial sanction if and when they do.
cluded in this type of rules are the following:

In

Rules prohibiting hazing,

bringing unfit or unauthorized literature to school, quarreling or
fighting, gambling, stealing, loitering about the school building, and
the throwing of missiles.

Pupils can not be refused admission to the

public schools nor punished by the school authorities in any school dis
trict for offenses committed in other school districts.

Pupils who are

not making satisfactory progress in school may be demoted.

Pupils may

be suspended from school if their parents disturb the good order of the
school or abuse a teacher of the school.

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
This study has been concerned with what the courts take into
consideration when determining the legality of school board rules
which apply to pupil conduct and discipline.
The courts recognize the authority of the constitutions, both
state and federal, in determining the general policy to be followed.
Where statutes are found, they are to be followed by the local school
boards, in which case the courts will not interfere unless the rule can
be shown to be unconstitutional.

The courts do not interfere with the

discretionary powers granted to the school boards by the various
legislatures.

The test of reasonableness is applied whenever a

question arises regarding the validity and legality of a school board
rule or regulation, but the courts do not question the wisdom of such
rules.

In several cases the courts have held rules to be reasonable,

although hinting that the particular application of the rule under
consideration is not too much in keeping with good judgment.

Such

hints are frequently brought out in dissenting opinions.
On the other hand, the courts will not sanction -unreasonable
rules, nor those which do not apply equally to all pupils.

Buies which

appear to be the result of arbitrary action or a spirit of malice on
the part of the board have not been supported by the courts.

To be

given judicial sanction, the rules made by a school board must be di
rectly related to promoting the good order, discipline, and best
interests of the school without interfering with the rights of parents
or pupils.

In this study court opinions have been quoted freely.

This

has been done to enable the reader to become familiar with the rea
soning followed by the courts in arriving at their decisions.

It is

not only the decision itself, but the reasoning which led up to it,
that should be considered by those who are charged with the responsi
bility of making rules for the government of schools.

Merely knowing

a decision without following the reasoning involved may be very mis
leading at times.

In following the courts1 reasoning, one learns that

the courts consider not only the general principles involved, but the
special situation and the particular circumstances of the case as well.
School administrators should be aware of this fact and formulate their
rules accordingly.

Failure to recognize this important principle may

result in reasonable rules being invalidated because of unreasonable
enforcement.

Rules should never be considered as so rigid and so final

as to be capable of handling all situations which arise.

Peculiar cir

cumstances may call for modifications in the enforcement of rules.
This is particularly true in the case of rules governing pupil conduct
and discipline.

Here the question of the rights of pupils and parents,

as well as the good order and best interests of the school, must be
carefully weighed.
To avoid the danger of unreasonable enforcement of rules, it
would perhaps be good practice not to state the penalty for violation
of each mile.

To follow a rule by the penalty may make it sound more

authoritative, but imposing the penalty for violation of the rule,
without regard to particular circumstances, is not a safe practice.
Penalties which require the payment of money for the violation of rules

must be very carefully avoided, because here is a chance of depriving
a child of an education because of his inability to pay.

Rules pro

viding for suspension or expulsion of pupils demand very careful con
sideration.

Depriving a child of the opportunity of an education is

a serious matter and school officials must be able to show good cause
for so doing.

Unless the offense is detrimental to the welfare, good

order, discipline, or progress of the school, the courts will not ap
prove exclusion from school as punishment.

School authorities should

understand that suspension and expulsion are resorted to only after
all other means of correction have failed to bring about proper con
duct.

In addition, excluding a child from school is not intended

merely as a punishment, but as a means of preserving order in the school
or of protecting the pupils from undesirable influences.
Rules requiring regular and punctual attendance and those re
quiring satisfactory excuses from parents for pupil absence and tardi
ness are found in most sets of rules.

Compulsory attendance laws

furnish the authority for making rules of this type.

Truancy is pro

hibited in most of the schools from which rules were obtained, and the
courts have sanctioned such rules by upholding regulations requiring
pupils to remain on the school premises throughout the entire day's
session.

Some schools permit pupils to be excused for a part of the

day for instruction elsewhere, although this privilege is denied in
other schools.

The courts ordinarily leave this matter to the dis

cretion of the school board, although if the board denies this privilege
to a pupil it should be able to show that the good order of the school

would be jeopardized by granting the request.

The extent to which a

parent may select a child's studies depends upon whether or not such
selection interferes with the right of the other pupils in the school.
Buies governing the time of admission into school buildings should con
sider the condition of the weather to protect the health of pupils.
School authorities may detain pupils after the regular session for
corrective or other purposes; the courts do not consider such detention
as false imprisonment.

Detaining pupils during intermissions and re

creation periods is discouraged by most school authorities.
Rules requiring pupils to pay for damaging or defacing school
property have not been supported by the courts.

The objection has not

been to the rule protecting the property, but rather to the penalty
which requires the payment of money for the damage done.

It would seem,

therefore, that rules protecting school property should not carry a
penalty involving monetary considerations.

Buies which may force a

pupil to pay any amount of money should be carefully considered.

If the

damage is done wilfully or maliciously, having a detrimental effect upon
school discipline, one court has hinted that exclusion of the pupil
might possibly be justified.

Assessing fines for undue wear of free

textbooks, or making a deposit to insure proper treatment of them,
brings up the money question again, which should be avoided in school
board rules.

Withholding a pupil's school credits for failure to pay

for property damage has not been definitely supported by the courts.
It has been generally recognized that the school authorities may
control the conduct of pupils from the time they leave home to go to
school until they return home from school.

School boards may regulate

or prohibit fraternities, sororities, or secret organizations among
pupils of the elementary and secondary schools.

School boards have

controlled such organizations by suspension or expulsion of offending
pupils by denying certain school privileges to fraternity members, and
by refusing to issue credits or diplomas to pupils who have violated the
fraternity rule.

State statutes prohibiting or providing for control of

fraternities in elementary and secondary schools have been upheld by the
courts whenever their constitutionality has been questioned.

Pupils may

be held responsible for their conduct on the way to or from school, or
for conduct anywhere if such conduct interferes with the good order and
discipline of the school.

Rules prohibiting loitering or gambling in

public places, rules forbidding pupils to smoke on the way to or from
school, rules governing the conduct in rooming places of out of town
pupils, and rules requiring that a pupil have permission to drive a car
to school, would probably be upheld by the courts as being necessary for
the best interests of the school.

Rules forbidding pupils to be on the

streets after 9:00 P. M. unless accompanied by a parent or guardian, and
miles forbidding pupils to attend dances on school nights are very close
to the borderline between parental and school control.

The weight of

judicial opinion favors parental control of the home and social life of
the pupil.
School authorities may legally make and enforce reasonable rules
governing the attitudes and general behavior of pupils in the public
schools.

Rules excluding pupils guilty of immoral conduct have been

upheld by the courts as necessary for the protection of the other pupils
in the school.

The courts have not supported miles denying the

privileges of an education to married pupils who are otherwise eligible
to attend school.

Although the courts have not been called upon to

decide the question, it is possible that married pupils may be rea
sonably excluded from the day schools if they are given an opportunity
to attend night schools.

Rules involving Bible reading in the public

schools have caused so many conflicting decisions that school authori
ties should perhaps leave them out of the rule books.

This would be in

line with the well-established American principle of separation of
church end state.

In several recent decisions the courts have upheld

rules requiring pupils to salute and pledge allegiance to the flag of
the United States.

Pupils must conform to rules requiring that they be

clean and neat in dress and person.

Schools may require pupils to take

home report cards and to bring them back with the parent's signature
thereon.

Rules prohibiting the use of tobacco, intoxicating liquors,

profane language, and the bringing of concealed weapons to school, have
been given judicial sanction.

There are a number of rules now in force

in public school systems which have not been before the courts but which
would probably receive judicial approval.
rules are the following:

Included in this type of

Rules prohibiting hazing, bringing unfit or

unauthorized literature to school, quarreling or fighting, gambling,
stealing, loitering about the school building, and the throwing of
missiles.

Pupils can not be refused admission to the public schools

nor punished by the school authorities in any school district for
offenses committed in other school districts.

The courts have upheld

the school authorities in demoting pupils who are unable to do the work
in any particular grade.

Pupils may be excluded from school if their

parents disturb the good order of the school or abuse the teacher.

Very little has been said in this study about statutes which
empower school boards to make certain rules.

Wherever statutes permit

certain rules to be made, the board's right to prescribe such rules is
not to be questioned unless the constitutionality of the statute can
be challenged.

An interesting study could be made of statutes relating

to rules governing pupil conduct and discipline.
After consideration of the rules obtained in this study, one or
two general suggestions concerning the formulating of school board rules
will be given.

To make rules covering every specific offense which is

likely to occur is unquestionably a task of great magnitude, if not an
impossibility.

A wiser and a more practical policy would be to make a

few general rules requiring proper conduct and not attempt to provide
for every specific offense which might possibly occur.
could be taken care of under these general rules.

Specific offenses

This policy would

also eliminate the many penalties provided for specific offenses, which
in some cases may make the enforcement of a reasonable rule illegal.
As a final suggestion, the manner of stating the rule will be considered.
From a psychological point of view and from the standpoint of positive
teaching, as many rules as possible should be stated, positively.
this manner the proper conduct and the desirable habits would be
emphasized.

In
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APPENDIX A
Schools From Which Rales Were Obtained
Fifty three school systems furnished either school hoard rules
or pupil handbooks for use in this study.

In most of the schools these

materials were obtained through the Superintendent's office or through
the office of the Director of Research.

The following named school

systems furnished the rules and regulations used in this study:
Mobile, Alabama; Flagstaff, Arizona; Fort Smith, Arkansas;
Alameda and Los Angeles, California; Wilmington, Deleware;
Macon, Georgia; Chicago, Oak Park, and Peoria, Illinois;
Evansville and Terre Haute, Indiana; Davenport and Dubuque,
Iowa; Wichita, Kansas; Paducah, Kentucky; Baton Rouge,
Louisiana; Bangor, Maine; Baltimore, Maryland; Springfield,
Massachusetts; Grand Rapids, Michigan; Minneapolis and
Rochester, Minnesota; Meridian, Mississippi; Joplin, Missouri;
Great Falls and Missoula, Montana; Nashua, New Hampshire;
Jersey City, New Jersey; Albany, New York; Charlotte, North
Carolina; Bismarck, Buxton, and New England, North Dakota;
Muskogee and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Hood River, Oregon;
Erie, Pennsylvania; Providence, Rhode Island; Charleston,
South Carolina; Aberdeen, South Dakota; Amarilla and Houston,
Texas; Rutland, Vermont; Norfolk and Petersburg, Virginia;
Aberdeen, Everett, Olympia, Spokane, and Yakima, Washington;
Racine and Superior, Wisconsin.

APPENDIX B
Summary of School Board Rales
The following list of rules obtained from the various schools
is not quoted directly from the rule books, but is a summary of those
rules.

The number following each rule indicates the number of schools

reporting that rule.
Attendance and Excuses.
Pupils must be regular and punctual in attendance. (31)
Absence and tardiness must be excused. (37)
Pupils may not be absent for other instruction without the consent of
the school authorities. (6)
Pupils must not leave school before the end of the session without
permission. (35)
Truancy will not be permitted. (22)
Pupils may be excused on their religious holidays and "sacred days"
upon parental request. (9)
No excuses will be granted for music, dancing, or drawing lessons. (4)
No pupil under sixteen years of age will be excused to take part in a
theatrical performance, (l)
Pupils may be excused from one and one-half hours to two hours per week
for music lessons. (2)
Pupils may be excused only the last period for music lessons, if the
last period is a study period and the pupil's school work is not
jeopardized.
Caddies, newsboys, etc., may be excused a day at a time for outside work
if they can afford to lose the time. (1)
Pupils may be excused for part of the day for educational or health
purposes if this does not interfere with their school work. (1)
Assembling on and Leaving School Grounds.
Pupils may not assemble on the school grounds an -unreasonable time
(more than twenty, thirty, or forty minutes) before the opening of
school, (ll)

Pupils may not enter the school building before 8:15 A. M. except in
inclement weather, (l)
Pupils may not assemble on school premises unless supervised by a
teacher or janitor. (3)
Pupils must remain on the school grounds during intermissions. (2)
Pupils within six blocks of the school must go home for lunch. (1)
Pupils may not leave the school grounds during lunch hour without
permission. (2)
Pupils should not be detained after school more than a reasonable
time (from twenty minutes to an hour is considered reasonable). (15)
Pupils may be detained after school at the teacher*s discretion, (l)
Pupils must leave the school premises promptly and quietly upon
dismissal. (17)
Property Damage.
Pupils must pay for defacing or damaging school property, books,
etc. (39)
Pupils will be held responsible for damage done to other pupils'
property. (1)
Pupils must pay fines for undue wear on books. (2)
Pupils must make satisfactory settlement of all issued school
property, (l)
Off School grounds and Out of School Hours.
Membership of pupils in secret societies or fraternities is pro
hibited. (6)
Pupils may not join any society not sanctioned by the board of
education, (l)
Pupils are responsible to the school for their conduct in the streets,
about the school, and for conduct on the way to and from school. (18)
Pupils must not be on the streets after 9:00 P. M. unless accompanied
by a parent or guardian, or having a permit from the school au
thorities. (2)
Pupils may not attend dances on school nights,

(l)

Pupils are responsible for their conduct anywhere if such conduct is
detrimental to the best interests of the school. (2)
School Attitudes and General Behavior.
Pupils must obey rules of the school board, superintendent, principal,
and teachers. (24)
Pupils must show proper deportment and attitudes about the school. (26)
Pupils are expected to be industrious, attentive to duties, and
diligent in study. (18)
Pupils must not be guilty of wilful violation or disobedience of rules,
defiant opposition to authority, or interference with the work of the
school. (15)
A pupil must not make a nuisance of himself about the school
premises, (l)
Pupils must not be guilty of gross insult or other serious offense
against the school. (1)
Pupils are responsible for their proper conduct during recess.
Pupils must not be obstinate nor incorrigible. (4)
Pupils are expected to be polite, courteous, respectful, and kind to
each other and to their teachers. (1@)
Pupils must not be guilty of any conduct detrimental to or subversive
of discipline. (19)
Pupils are expected to be truthful, refraining from telling falsehoods
and cheating. (5)
Pupils must show gentlemanly and orderly conduct. (20)
Pupils must not have injurious, vicious, or immoral habits, nor be
guilty of such conduct. (21)
No profane, obscene, offensive, indecent, or improper language, writing
or pictures will be permitted about the school building. (23)
Married Pupils.
Pupils marrying during the school year shall be automatically excluded
from the day schools. (2)

Bible Reading.
The morning session shall be opened by the reading of some portion of
the Bible. (2)
The Principal shall open the school each morning by reading at least
five verses from the Old Testament, without comment. (1)
Patriotic Exercises.
The Principal shall require the pupils of the school to salute the
United States flag and repeat the oath of allegiance on every school
day. (l)
Dress and Personal Appearance.
Pupils must be neat and clean in dress and person. (20)
Pupils must wear proper apparel, girls must not dress as boys, and
costumes for Baccalaureate, Class Night, and Commencement Night must
conform to board requirements, (l)
Specific Offenses.
Report cards must be signed and returned to the school. (1)
Smoking is prohibited on the school premises. (31)
Hazing and all hazardous or “poor taste" initiations are prohibited. (6)
Pupils are forbiddeh to engage in quarreling or fighting. (5)
Pupils must not bring unfit reading matter to school nor distribute
any unauthorized literature. (2)
Drinking or selling intoxicating liquor is prohibited. (5)
Gambling is not permitted on the school premises. (4)
Stealing will not be tolerated. (5)
Pupils may not throw missiles on or about the school premises. (4)
Forging excuses will not be tolerated. (2)
Loitering in the halls and about the school building is prohibited. (6)
Pupils must stay out of cars during school hours. (1)
Pupils must not bring concealed weapons, firearms, deadly or dangerous
playthings upon the school grounds. (7)

Pupils may not enter a school while under suspension from another
school without the superintendent's consent. (4)
Pupils not doing satisfactory work may be demoted. (7)
Pupils' relatives must not disturb the school nor abuse the
teacher. (2)
Pupils must have permission from the school authorities if they
wish to drive cars to school, (l)
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